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The Tigris and Euphrates river basin is located in arid and semi-arid regions of the Middle East.  
Five countries share this basin, with Turkey, Syria, and Iraq being the main nations concerned.  
The water resources of the basin are unable to meet the entire current and future water demands 
of all of these nations. Water scarcity in this basin is caused by one-sided, unilateral development 
projects and complicated by natural conditions, such as reduced annual rainfall.  Shared 
freshwater resources are complicated matters that cause tensions between nations sharing river 
basins, especially in arid and semi-arid regions.  The shared fresh water problem in the Tigris and 
Euphrates River Basins nations is further complicated since it exacerbates desertification and 
environmental instability in Iraq because of its downstream location.  The problem of 
environmental instability in Iraq further complicates the shared fresh water problem because it 
raises current tensions among Iraq’s ethnic groups causing more conflicts over resources, which 
in turn threatens the regional security in the Tigris and Euphrates River Basins.  To this day, these 
three nations do not have an agreement for sharing the water resources to ensure sustainable 
water management in the basin. This thesis provides: (1) insights on how to manage water 
resources in the Tigris and Euphrates basin to prevent regional conflicts between the nations 
sharing this fresh water resource, and (2) suggests water conservation methods targeted 
specifically to Iraq. These methods include rainwater harvesting, managing vegetative cover 
through forestry systems to slow desertification, and using available water resources as efficiently 





This thesis is about the causes, consequences and mitigation of desertification in the 
Tigris and Euphrates River basins in Iraq.  The problem of desertification in Iraq is significant 
because it threatens the livelihood of the Iraqis, specifically in central and southern Iraq.  The 
problem is further complicated as desertification will force people in south and central Iraq to 
move to the north of Iraq and the Kurdistan Region.  The north of Iraq and specifically the 
Kurdistan Region is the richest region in Iraq by its ground and surface water resources in 
addition to fertile lands when compared with the other parts of Iraq.  The north part of Iraq 
already suffers from ethnic problems as a result of different Iraqi regimes specifically Saddam’s 
administration policies, which brought Arabs from south and central Iraq to replace Kurds and 
other ethnic groups and changed demographics in the Kurdistan Region.  Therefore, any further 
population movement from south toward north of Iraq, for whatever reason, will cause tensions 
among ethnic groups, Kurds and Arabs, in Iraq 
and it is strongly possible that this conflict will 
move to all of the Tigris and Euphrates River 
basins nations.  The key recommendations in this 
thesis to prevent such conflicts are: (1) regional 
cooperation to identify a fair water management 
strategy to share the Tigris and Euphrates River 
in a way that would be accepted by downstream 
and upstream nations, and (2) the effective use of 
Figure 1: Shows the Tigris and Euphrates River 





available resources in Iraq through implementing rainwater harvesting techniques and forestry 
systems to combat desertification, specifically north of Iraq. 
Shared freshwater resources are complicated matters that cause tensions among/between 
nations sharing river basins, especially in arid and semi-arid regions.  The Tigris and Euphrates 
River Basins are located in arid and semi-arid regions of the Middle East.  Five countries share 
the Tigris and Euphrates Basins, with Turkey, Syria, and Iraq being the major nations concerned.  
The water resources of the Tigris and Euphrates Basin are unable to meet the entire current and 
future water demands for all of these nations.  Water scarcity in this basin is caused by one-sided, 
unilateral development projects within nations in the basin, and is complicated by natural 
conditions, such as reduced annual rainfall.  To this day, these three nations do not have a 
regional, multilateral agreement to share the water resources to ensure sustainable water 
management in the Tigris and Euphrates River basins (Kaya 1998) (table 1 – page 17).   
The problem of fresh water availability in the Tigris and Euphrates River basins is 
complicated by climate change, population growth, and increasing demand for economic 
development in the region.  Downstream water shortages in the Tigris and Euphrates River basins 
have the potential to be geopolitically destabilizing in the Turkey-Iraq-Iran-Syria region.  Indeed, 
water shortage could be highly threatening and the root cause of future armed conflict among 
these nations.  The major challenge to any regional solution is how to bring Turkey—because of 
its upstream position and military power—to negotiate water rights that are acceptable to its 
downstream neighbors.  The Tigris and Euphrates Rivers have significant value to Iraq for 
potable water, irrigation, hydropower and environmental values.  Iraq is the most vulnerable 
country regarding water shortage because of its downstream location.  The water shortage in Iraq 
results in acceleration of land degradation and desertification, which in turn threatens the 






International Law and Transboundary Water Resources    
This section addresses the terminology and state-level approach of each riparian nation 
about the legal case of the Tigris and Euphrates River.  The reasons that each nation insists on its 
opinion of these two rivers legal case is identified. The Tigris and Euphrates River Basins case is 
analyzed regarding to the each riparian nation opinion and details is provided regarding the Tigris 
and Euphrates River case according to international fresh water treaties and guidelines.            
The UN Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses 1997 (Article 2 – a) defined ―Watercourse‖ as ―a system of surface waters and 
groundwaters constituting by virtue of their physical relationship a unitary whole and normally 
flowing into a common terminus,‖ and (Article 2 – b) defined ―International watercourse‖ as ―a 
watercourse, parts of which are situated in different States.‖  The trans-boundary term is used by 
Turkish authorities.  Turkey defines International Watercourses as a river that follows the 
political border between two countries or more while the watercourse that intersects the political 
border between the two countries or more considers trans-boundary river.  Therefore each country 
has complete sovereignty to use a trans-boundary river until it leaves its border without taking 
into consideration the other riparian nations’ needs for water (Asmahel 2004).  Therefore Turkey 
is using the Tigris and Euphrates River according to its statement that both of the rivers are 
Turkish rivers and ignores the UN Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses 1997 based on equitable and reasonable use of International 
watercourses.    
The ―Tigris and Euphrates Rivers as a single basin‖ approach is used by Turkey.  Turkey 
stated that the Tigris and the Euphrates are two tributaries of the Shatt el Arab River.  Therefore 
Turkey allows diverting water from the Tigris River to the Euphrates River and vice versa since 





on this approach is to divert water from the Tigris to the Euphrates because of the topographic 
condition of the Tigris basin in Turkey is not suitable for big agricultural projects and population 
densities is low unlike the Euphrates basin.  Therefore by diverting water from the Tigris River to 
the Euphrates River Turkey can cover any water shortages in its projects on the Euphrates basin 
(Asmahel 2004).   
The ―Tigris and Euphrates Rivers as separate basins‖ approach is used by Iraq.  Iraq 
stated that the Tigris and the Euphrates have separate basins and the fact that the Tigris and 
Euphrates meet at Shat Al Arab River do not make them a single basin as stated by Turkey.  
Therefore, Iraq stated that its share from the Tigris River is different from the Euphrates.  In 
short, Iraq demands a separate agreement for the Euphrates River and the Tigris River (Asmahel 
2004).     
On one hand, according to topographic, hydrologic, meteorological, and geological 
characteristics, the Tigris and Euphrates are separate watersheds but Turkey has chosen to regard 
them as part of the greater Shatt al Arab basin in order to get more water from both rivers.  On the 
other hand, since both the Tigris and Euphrates River are meets in south of Iraq and discharge 
their water on Shatt Al Arab River, technically Turkish approach is correct too.       
To date, there is no a single enforceable international law dealing with the problems 
confronted in the Tigris-Euphrates Basins.  Codifying international law regarding International 
Watercourses traces back to the beginning of the twentieth century and the most significant 
efforts started recently.  The International Law Association’s (ILA) 1966 Helsinki Rules 
identified that the international drainage basin have to be shared equitably and reasonably.  An 
international drainage basin as defined by the Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of 
International Rivers in 1966 is ―a geographical area extending over two or more States 





waters, flowing into a common terminus.‖  In 1970 the International Law Commission (ILC) was 
asked by the United Nations General Assembly to codify and develop a law regarding ―non 
navigation use of international watercourses.‖  The ILC efforts resulted in the UN Watercourse 
Convention on the law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, opened for 
signature in 1997, and provided the same factors to identify fair management of international 
watercourses as Helsinki Rules which are reasonable and equitable use of international drainage 
basin (Kaya 1998).  In 2004, the Helsinki Rules were replaced by Berlin Rules, according to 
Berlin Conference in 2004; ―An ―international drainage basin‖ is a drainage basin extending over 
two or more States.‖  Generally Berlin Rules identified that basin nations have the right to 
participate in the management of waters of an international drainage basin in an equitable, 
reasonable, and sustainable manner.    
The reasonable and equitable depends on these factors: geography, hydrology, climate, 
past and present utilization, economic and social needs of the riparian nations, population, costs 
of alternative measures, other resources, practicability of compensation in instance of dispute, and 
how the needs of one riparian nation may be fulfilled without substantial injury to another 
riparian nation (Kaya 1998).  With respect to the Tigris-Euphrates watersheds, the major 
challenges are: (1) the UN Watercourse Convention on the law of the Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses is not recognized by Turkey (Kent State University’s Research Center 
for Educational Technology 2008), and (2) Turkey does not consider the Tigris and the Euphrates 
to be International Watercourses. 
According to the definition of International Watercourses that identified by the UN 
Watercourse Convention on the law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 
both the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers should be considered International Watercourses and 
therefore the theory of equitable and reasonable use apply to both of them, but Turkey disputes 





Rivers should be considered to be part of international drainage basins and the approach of 
equitable and reasonable applied to them.  None of the mentioned laws and treaties are enforced 
international laws.   
However, even by Turkey’s own definitions, both the Tigris and Euphrates are 
International watercourses.  For example, Turkey defines International watercourses as a river 
that follows the borders of two or more countries.  In this case the Tigris River is considered 
International River because it follows Turkey – Syria borders for about 50 km and Syria – Iraq 
borders for about 7 km.  The same approach applied for both Khabour and Greater Zab (two of 
the Tigris River tributaries), because both of them follow 55 km and 50 km Iraq- Turkey borders 
respectively.  Since Turkey considers both the Tigris and Euphrates a single river basin, then both 
of them are International watercourses (Asmahel 2004).  Therefore, the reasons that Turkey is not 
accepting to share these two rivers with other riparian nations are: (1) It is in Turkey’s national 
self-interest to maintain total sovereign control over these rivers while they are within Turkish 
borders, (2) there is no enforceable international legal regime dealing with transboundary 
freshwater flows, and (3) Turkey is stronger than both Syria and Iraq regarding military, 
economic, and political power.    
 Nonetheless, even if the Tigris and Euphrates are recognized as International 
Watercourses by Turkey, problems will persist until the following questions are resolved: (1) how 
does each riparian nation defines equitable and reasonable uses and can they agree on these? (2) 
who will identify the economic and social needs of each riparian nation and according to what 
criteria? (3) if the social and economic needs are identified by riparian nations themselves, how 
reliable will this information be? (4) if International Organizations such as the UN identified the 
riparian nations’ social and economic needs, would the riparian nations accept the results? (5) 





considered key to regulating access amounts -- only those who are living in the Tigris and 
Euphrates Basins or the overall population of each country? 
The purpose of this thesis is to identify the causes, consequences, and mitigation of 
desertification in the Tigris and Euphrates River Basins in Iraq.  The impact of desertification 
problems in Iraq on the other riparian nations is analyzed.  This thesis provides insights to solve 
desertification issues in Iraq regionally, through proposing a regional cooperation among riparian 
nations regarding fair management of shared fresh water resources, and locally, through 
implementing rainwater harvesting techniques and forestry systems in order to use available 
resources in Iraq, specifically north of Iraq, as efficiently as possible.  This thesis is organized as 
follows: (1) Salient physical, economic and social characteristic of the Tigris and Euphrates River 
Basins, (2) Iraq’s land characteristics, (3) Factors that lead to desertification, (4) The social, 
economic and political consequences of desertification on the Tigris and Euphrates River Basins 
Nations, (5) Managing the Tigris and Euphrates River water resources, (6) Strategies to combat 
desertification in Iraq and the Kurdistan Region, and (7) Conclusions. 
Water Shortage  
Identifying the average annual flow of the Tigris and Euphrates River is very hard 
because of the large yearly fluctuation.  Records for from 1938 to 1980 show that there has been 
yearly flows of (Tigris – Euphrates together) of 68 km
3
 and 84 km
3
 recorded in the mid – 1960s 
and the mid – 1970s respectively.  Also, there have been years during severe drought periods 
where the flow of both rivers were below 30 km
3
.  Therefore, it is difficult to have a constant 
adequate water allocation plan managing these two rivers in a way that ensures a fair share of 
water among riparian nations (FAO 2009) .   According to Congressional Research Service  2004, 
the Euphrates River has an average flow of 30 km
3
 and the Tigris River a bit more than 21 km
3 





observation time.  For instance, Asmael 2004 identified that the Tigris flow is about 48 km
3
 and 
Beaumont 1997 estimated it about 51 km
3
.    
The water crisis in Iraq is getting worse over time; the 450 – 500 m
3
/sec of water that 
released from the Euphrates River at the point where it enters Syria is not enough to help Iraqis 
who are struggling from the severe drought years.  For instance in September 2009, 2000 people 
abounded their homes in a fishing village a round Shatt el Arab river because the decline of Shatt 
el Arab River and steadily encroaching sea water toward Shatt el Arab, and in August 3000 
people moved out (UPI 2009).   
Upon completion of its dams early in the 21
st
 century in Turkey, the storage capacity of 
these dams on the Euphrates River will be equal to 1.38 times the annual flow of the River.  
Turkey has less control of the Tigris River.  In 1997, it was expected that the Turkey’s demand 




 = 1,000,000,000 m
3
) and the 
demand to be about 16 km
3
 for Syria and Iraq together.  However, the average annual flow of the 
Euphrates River has fallen below 20 km
3
 on a few occasions.  Therefore, the water deficit is 
about 6 km
3
 in this case.  The major concern is that Syria as its upstream neighbor, Turkey, 
started developing projects in the 1960s, therefore the mentioned rates of water use is just a 
beginning of a larger use of water through expanding irrigated lands (Beaumont 1998).    
It is expected that Syria irrigates about 475,000 ha in early years of 21
st
 century, which 
consumes about 4.75 km
3
/year of water.  Sources of Syrian government have suggested that the 
area of irrigated lands in the Euphrates basin in Syria may rise to 1,000,000 ha, which in turn 
increase water consumption to 10 km
3
/year.  Therefore, in the case of irrigating 475,000 ha of 
land in Syria, Iraq receives about 10 km
3
/year form the Euphrates River.  But in the case of 
1,000,000 ha, Iraq only receive 5 km
3
/year.  Both case based on a flow of 500 m
3
/sec that 





In the case if both Turkey and Syria extracted the maximum amount of water for 
expected needs for irrigation, Iraq will only receive 5 km
3
/year from the Euphrates River while 
Iraq in the1960s was receiving about 16,368 km
3
 and the demand  is expected to be about 25 – 28 
km
3
/year in a period after 2020.  Generally, Beaumont 1997 based on estimation of three scholars 
regarding future needs of water in Syria, Turkey and Iraq in a period after 2020 estimates (taking 
into consideration water resources in both the Tigris and Euphrates River) the possibility of water 
defect of 2.233 km
3
 as minimum and 38.641 km
3
/year (greater than the Euphrates annual flow) as 
maximum depending on the areas of irrigated lands in each country (Beaumont 1998).          
















Salient Physical, Social, and Economic Characteristics of the Tigris and Euphrates River 
Basins 
This chapter focuses on analyzing: (1) the legal case of the Tigris and Euphrates River 
and providing the bilateral agreement between riparian nations, (2) the distribution of water 
resources in the Tigris and Euphrates Basins, (3) population growth in the basin nations, (4) 
annual precipitation and water balance in these basins, (5) Turkish economic exploitation of basin 
water resources, and (6) land degradation and desertification in Iraq.    
The major concerns indicated in this chapter are the increased demand of fresh water and 
the situation complicated by climate change.  Also, the fast growth of population size has 
significant impacts on managing the two rivers.  The most important problem is, at least 
according to downstream nation views, the majority of water resources of the Tigris and 
specifically the Euphrates is originated in Turkey, which makes Turkey to have a control on any 
negotiations regarding water management in the Tigris and Euphrates River.  In addition to 
unequal geographic distribution of the Tigris and Euphrates water resources problems, each 








Transboundary Agreements and Issues Within the Tigris-Euphrates Basins 
  The legal case of 
the Tigris and Euphrates 
River basins has changed 
from Internal (National) 
River to International 
River after dissolving of 
the Ottoman Empire by 
the end of the World 
War I.  The Tigris and 
Euphrates River Basins 
is now divided between 
the relatively newly created nations of Turkey (1923), Iraq (1921), Syria (1946), and Saudi 
Arabia (1932), in addition to Iran.  Therefore, the legal case changed from internal (national) river 
to International River because they pass through different nations (Asmahel 2004) (Figure 2).   
Multinational efforts to manage water resources regarding water quantity, infrastructure 
development, and technical cooperation began in the 1920s in the Tigris and Euphrates River 
Basins (Table 1 – page 17). 
The following table shows the treaties and agreements between the riparian nations 
regarding management of Tigris and Euphrates water resources. The importance of the treaties 
and agreements that are listed in table 1 are highlighting the major concerns in the Tigris and 
Euphrates River basins between/among basins nations as following (Oregon State University 
2007):  






1- Franco - Britain Convention on certain points connected with Syria, the Lebanon, 
Palestine and Mesopotamia (1920): The objective of this agreement was establishing a 
commission to observe and to examine the impact of the irrigation plan in the French 
controlled region on water flow to the British controlled region of Mesopotamia. 
2- Iraq and Turkey Treaty of friendship and neighborly relationships (1946): The 
following were the main objective of this treaty: each country respect the drawn border 
between them according to 1926 agreement, each country has to observe a policy of 
absolute non – intervention to the other country domestic affairs, peaceful solution for 
any disputes between them and refer to UN in case of any disputes, each country support 
the other one regarding to international affairs especially those having regional character 
affecting themselves in the United Nations, cooperation regarding water management in 
Turkey and exchanging information, cooperation regarding security issue, cooperation 
regarding educational institutional and cultural matter, cooperation regarding establishing 
postal, telegraphic and telephonic communication between each other, cooperation 
regarding economic development, and cooperation to ensure the security in frontier area 
between the two countries,       
3- Treaty concerning the state frontier and neighborly relations between Iran and Iraq 
and protocol (1975): The major objective of this treaty were border and water pollution 
issues mainly demarcation of rivers, specifically Shut el Arab River. 
4- Agreement between Iraq and Iran concerning the use of frontier watercourse 
(1975): The major objectives of this agreement were agreeing on dividing water quantity 
of the watercourses that follow the frontier line between the two countries and successive 
watercourses which intersect the frontier line between the two countries in a way satisfy 
both sides with secondary discussion about border issue.  
5- Law No.14 of 1990 between Iraq and Syria, ratifying the Joint Minutes concerning 





this law were dividing a fixed annual total percentage (water year) of the water of 
Euphrates River allowed to pass in Syria through the border with Turkey between Iraq, 
58%, and Syria, 42%, and establishing joint committee to implement this agreement. 
6- Minutes between Syria and Turkey on cooperation in fighting terrorism, signed at 
Adana, including Annex 2 (1998): Agreement between Syria and Turkey to combat 
Kurdistan labor Party (PKK).  Syria will stop supporting PKK in order to normalize its 
relation with Turkey and prevent armed conflicts between them 
7- Joint communiqué between Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Southeastern 
Anatolia Project Regional Development Administration (GAP) and Arab Republic 
of Syria Ministry of Irrigation General Organization for Land Development 
(GOLD) (2001): The purpose of this agreement was technical cooperation between 
Turkey’s Southeastern Anatolia Project Regional Development Administration (GAP) 
and Syria’s General Organization for Land Development (GOLD) regarding training 
programs, joint projects, and exchange programs 
The problem is the majority of these agreements have never been implemented on the 
ground.  The main evidences for that are frequent changes in the Euphrates River water flow, 30 
days shut off of flow in the 1990s during filling of Ataturk dam in Turkey, while according to 
Protocol on matters pertaining to economic cooperation between Syrian Arab Republic and 
Turkey, signed at Damascus on 17 July 1987 mentioned that Turkey is responsible to release 500 
m
3
/sec of water at the point where Euphrates enter Syria.  Iraq – Iran war as a result of border 
disputes is another example of failure to implement agreements on the ground, even though Iraq 
and Iran had an agreement, treaty concerning the state frontier and neighborly relations between 
Iran and Iraq and protocol in 1975, regarding border issue, specifically in Shut el Arab River area, 





The major problem is that the three concerned riparian nations (Syria, Turkey and Iraq) 
do not have an agreement or treaty together; they only have bilateral treaties and agreements, 
refer to table 1 (page 17).  Also, the 1987 protocol that appointed responsibility to Turkey to 
release 500 m
3
/sec of water at the point where Euphrates enters Syria was signed between Syria 
and Turkey without taking into consideration Iraq, which is another riparian nation located 
downstream.  Therefore, Syria has a separate agreement to share the Euphrates River with Iraq, 
Law No.14 of 1990 between Iraq and Syria, ratifying the Joint Minutes concerning the 
provisional division of the waters of the Euphrates River.  Since there are two separate 
agreements to manage the Euphrates River, Turkey – Syria and Syria – Iraq, between the riparian 
nations, it means that Iraq is not required to respect the Turkey – Syria agreement nor is Turkey 
required to respect the Syria – Iraq agreement.  On one hand, Iraq is demanding 700 m
3
/sec 
(Aaron T. Wolf 2007) of water to enter Syria from the point where Euphrates enters Syria’s 
borders and Iraq said that it is not a part of the 1987 protocol and therefore Iraq did not agree on 
500 m
3
/sec.  On the other hand, any disruption of 500 m
3
/sec of the Syria – Turkey agreement 
will automatically change the quantity of water that Iraq receives, which creates problems 
between Iraq and Syria.  Therefore, any treaty and agreement in order to be valid must be based 
on tripartite agreement. 
The legal and ownership issues of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers are very complicated.  
Iraq and Syria consider the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers as international Watercourses.  Therefore, 
both Iraq and Syria request a fair share from the Tigris and Euphrates water resources.  Turkey 
does not consider the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers to be international rivers, instead Turkey calls 
them transboundary rivers, which means each one is a Turkish river until it leaves Turkey’s 
borders.  Several formal letters were sent to both Syria’s and Iraq’s government from Turkey’s 
government stating that Turkey will not agree to share Turkish water resources with Iraq and 





Neither Syria nor Iraq can lay claim to Turkey’s rivers any more than Ankara could claim their oil 
… The water resources are Turkey’s, the oil resources are theirs. We don’t say we share their oil 
resources, and they can’t say they share our water resources (Kent State University’s Research 
Center for Educational Technology 2008). 
One of the Turkish government men, Kamaran Inan
1
, said, ―If Syria and Iraq are 
requesting a share of Turkish water, then Turkey has a right to request a share of their 
petroleum.‖  Turkey always mentioned through its leaders that it is ready to negotiate the use of 
water in a way that all of the riparian nations receive benefits from available water resources, but 
Turkey reserves the right to withdraw water for its domestic needs as internal demand dictates.  In 
effect, then Turkey will use as much water as it needs without taking in consideration the 
downstream nations water demands (Asmahel 2004) (Ünal Öziş, Yalçın Özdemir 2009).     
Turkey’s authorities are not motivated to sign a specific agreement about water resource 
management with the downstream nations.  But Turkish authorities are more interested in a multi-
purpose agreement related to the security situation, economic cooperation, and energy with the 
Syria and Iraq.  In addition to redrawing a political border with Syria, the security and economic 
issue are the major concerns of Turkey.  For example, according to Iraq news paper, Alsabaah, 
Turkey is trying to get subsidies oil from Iraq in exchange for water (Mhna 2006).  For security 
case, in 1978, Syria supported the Kurds
2
 who are living in Turkey to establish an armed party, 
Kurdistan Labor Party (PKK), in order to use them against Turkey and force Turkey to provide 
Syria a fair share of the Euphrates River.  Therefore, security is Turkey’s priority for any 
agreements with Syria or Iraq (Asmahel 2004).  In 1999, Syria’s government stopped supporting 
                                                             
1 Kurdish/Turkish politician, member of Turkish parliament at various times, Turkish UN Ambassador at 
various time, permanent UN representative, Minister of Energy and Natural Resources and Minister of 
state.   
 






Kurdistan Labor Party as a result of Turkey’s threatens to declare war against Syria if Syria did 
not stop supporting PKK, see Minutes between Syria and Turkey on cooperation in fighting 
terrorism, signed at Adana, including Annex 2 (1998) above .   After PKK rebels were forced to 
leave Syria in 1999, to date the PKK rebels are located in northern Iraq, which has created a 
significant obstacle for any efforts for water management agreements between Iraq and Turkey.  
Because of PKK rebels attacking Turkish army between time and time, therefore Turkey stated 
that it will not cooperate with Iraq regarding water issue unless Iraq take actions against existing 
PKK members in its Land.  But Iraq cannot take any actions against PKK because: (1) PKK 
rebels settled in the mountainous region which is very hard to take military actions against them, 
and (2) The areas that the PKK rebels settled in are dominated by Iraqi – Kurds and Kurds, 
generally, are strongly supporting PKK.  In 2009, Syria and Turkey assigned a strategic 
agreement including 30 sectors, one of which focused on the fresh water issue which finished 
decades of tensions between these two neighbors (Aljazeera A 2009). 
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Political Jurisdictions and Water Resources 
There are four riparian nations sharing these two rivers: Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran.  
Saudi Arabia contributes only episodically to the Euphrates River Basin.  Iran does not contribute 
to the Euphrates River, but serves as headwaters for tributaries of the Tigris River, and a large 
tributary of the Shatt el Arab waterway, outside the scope of this study.  The Tigris and Euphrates 
Rivers are very close to each other, though they have separate watersheds (Asmahel 2004).  
The Tigris River basin is within the boundaries of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria. The area 





in Turkey, 45,000 km
2 
in Iran, and 836 km
2 
in Syria.  The overall area of the Tigris 
river basin is 289,000 km
2
, which it means that Iraq controls 64.2%, Turkey 20%, Iran 15.75%, 
and Syria 0.3% of the Tigris River Basin.  But this area does not reflect the amount of water that 
each of these countries contributes to the Tigris River.  The area of feeding basin
3
 is different than 
the area of virtual basin
4
.  Although only 19.93% of the River basin is within Turkey’s boundary, 
the region provides 54.62% of the Tigris River’s water.  Iraq contains 64.2% of the Tigris River 
Basin, but Iraq only contributes 33.45% of the Tigris River’s water.  Iran’s 15.57% of the Tigris 
River Basin supplies 11.78% of the Tigris River’s water.  Meanwhile, Syria claims only 0.3% of 
the Tigris River Basin and makes no significant contribution to the water that flows in the Tigris 




                                                             
3 A feeding basin\ is the geographic location that supplies the river with its water.  For example, the areas 
within the basin boundaries that have rainfall and/or snowfall and/or ground water that are contribute to the 
river water. 
 






Table 2: Shows the Tigris River Basin information in each of the riparian nations (Asmahel 2004). 
Country %Area (km
2
) of the River Basin % Contribution to the River water 
Iraq 64.2 33.45 
Turkey 20 54.62 
Iran 15.75 11.78 
Syria 0.3 0.15 
Total 100 100 
   
The main characteristic of the Tigris River is the geographic distribution of its tributaries 
and water resources.  In addition to the tributaries that enter in Turkey, there are four more 
tributaries in Iraq and Iran that feed Tigris by water: Great Zab, Lesser Zab, Adhaim and Diyala 
feed the Tigris in the middle portion of its course.  It is difficult to control flow of the Tigris from 
a single country because it requires a lot of dams in order to control output because of the 
topographic characteristics of its basin is not as suitable as the Euphrates Basin for building dams 
and geographic variety of the Tigris water resources (Beaumont 1998). 
The Euphrates River Basin is within the boundary of Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi 
Arabia. The Euphrates River Basin is bigger than the Tigris River basin by 35%.  The overall area 
of the Euphrates River Basin is 444,000 km
2
.  The following are the Euphrates basin areas in each 
of the riparian countries: 177,000 km
2 
in Iraq, which is 40% of the Basin area; 125,000 km
2
 in 
Turkey, or 28% of the Basin area; 76,000 km
2
 in Syria accounting for 17% of the Basin area; and 
66,000 km
2
 in Saudi Arabia, or 15% of the Basin area.  The mentioned area represent the virtual 
area of Euphrates River Basin, while the actual area of Euphrates feeding basin is about 110,000 
km
2
 which represents 25.2% of the overall Euphrates River Basin area, mostly located in Turkey 







Table 3: Shows the Euphrates River Basin information in each of the riparian nations (Asmahel 2004). 
Country %Area  of the River Basin % Contribution to the River water 
Turkey 28 98% 
Syria 17 2% 
Iraq 40 No significant contribution 
Saudi Arabia 15 No significant contribution 
Total 100 100 
 
The geography of tributaries and water resources of the Euphrates River Basin is unlike 
the Tigris River Basin.  54.8% of the Euphrates River Basin is within Iraq and Saudi Arabia’s 
boundary, but neither of them contribute to the Euphrates River water because almost all of the 
actual area of the Euphrates feeding basin is within Turkey and Syria’s boundaries: 98% and 2% 
respectively (Asmahel 2004).  The concentration of the water resources of the Euphrates River 
Basin in Turkey means that any single dam will have a significant impact on the proportion of 
water released toward downstream countries (Beaumont 1998). 
Population Pressures Within the Basins 
According to the United Nations estimates, the overall population in the Tigris and 
Euphrates River basins nations in 2050 will be 295.3 million.  While in 2010 the overall 
population is 204.8 million.  The rate of growth from 2010 to 2050 is about 44.2%.  With this fast 
growing population, it is normal that people will move where the resources are available.  In case 
of Turkey, according to Asmahel 2004, the Tigris and Euphrates River Basins are the richest 
regions in Turkey by its water resources.  Therefore, the possibility of implementing more 
effective strategies to meet the population demands of water is very high.  The same approach is 
applied for both Syria and Iran and therefore Iraq as a downstream nation will be severely 





(2) Turkey, Syria, and Iran population growth will lead to further decline of released water from 
the watercourses that originated in these countries toward Iraq.  
According to United Nations’ estimates of population size and density, each of the Tigris 
and Euphrates riparian nations is experiencing population growth.   Iraq will experience a 
dramatic population growth in the next forty years (figure 3), from 31,467,000 in 2010 to 
63,995,000 in 2050.  A 100% of the Iraqi populations are living in the Tigris and Euphrates River 
Basin (see figure 7 – page 23).  Therefore, the Tigris and Euphrates River have a critical 
influence on Iraqis’ livelihoods and their futures.  The Tigris and Euphrates River in Iraq is 
estimated to irrigate about 4,900,000 hectares of land (Asmahel 2004).  
Table 4: Shows the population growth from 2010 to 2050 in each of the Tigris and Euphrates riparian 
nations (UN 2008). 
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                As in Iraq, there will be a significant increase in Syria’s population size over the next 
40 years (figure 4); net change of population in Syria from 2010 to 2050 is 14,406,000.  The 
Euphrates River is one of the major resources that support Syria’s economy.  The Euphrates River 
has a significant value for Syria because considerable portion of Syria’s populations are living in 
this River Basin (See figure 6 – page 23) and it is estimated to irrigate 760500 hectares of land 
(University of California 2006). 
The population growth rate in Turkey is shown in figure 5.  As shown in the figure, the 
growth rate is slower than the growth rate in Iraq and Syria.  But by 2050, Turkey’s population 
Figure 3: shows Iraq’s population growth from 1950 to 
2050.  (UN 2008) 
Figure 4: Shows Syria’s population growth from 1950 
to 2050.  (UN 2008) 
Figure 5: Shows Turkey’s population growth from 1950 to 2050  
(UN 2008). 
Figure 6: Shows Iran’s population growth from 





will almost reach a hundred million.  Even if a small portion of Turkey’s populations are living in 
these River Basins (Figure 7), the overall population increase will lead to more significant water 
management issues.  It is estimated that Turkey is planning to use the Tigris and Euphrates water 
resources to irrigate 1,700,000 hectares of land in Anatolian drylands (Asmahel 2004). 
Iran’s population in the next half century will increase to almost a hundred million, as 
shown in figure 6.  Iran is experiencing the slowest growth rate in the region.  Iran does not 
contribute to the Euphrates River basin.  But, there are a few big and small tributaries within 
Iranian borders that contribute to the Tigris River.  A significant portion of Iranian populations 






are living in the Tigris River basin (Figure 7).  Therefore, these water resources are significant 
regarding supporting the livelihood of Iranian and it is estimated to irrigate 93900 hectares of 
land (University of California 2006).    
Annual Precipitation, Water Balance, and Expected Climate Change 
Generally, the water balance in the Tigris and Euphrates River basins is negative, -1150 - 
-1000 mm in the southern regions of the basins and gradually increase to 1 – 150 mm in the top 
northern region in the basins.  Generally, over 95% of the basins area has a negative water 
balance.  The annual evapotranspiration decreases gradually form the northern region of the 
basins, 401 – 716 mm, toward the southern region, 1 – 120 mm (UNDP 2008).        
Annual precipitation rates for the basin areas include both rainfall and snowfall.  
Generally, the rain precipitation occurs in most of the Tigris and Euphrates River basins but the 
amount varies from very low in southern regions and increasing toward northern regions.  The 
average rain precipitation rate in Turkey is 700mm in the Euphrates Basin and 850mm in the 
Tigris basin.  In Syria, the average rain precipitation rate is 100 – 200 mm in the southern region 
of the Euphrates basin, 200 – 300 mm in the northern region, and 400 – 600 mm in a small 
portion in the top northeastern region.  In Iraq, the average rain precipitation is 815 mm in the 
mountainous region of northeast of Iraq, 315 mm in the semi mountainous region, located below 
mountainous region, and 145 mm in the sedimentary plain, located in the middle and south of 
Iraq in between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, and 100 mm or less in the southwestern portions 
of Iraq and northeastern areas of Saudi Arabia.  In Iran, the rainfall rate decreases from north 
toward southern region of the Tigris basin (Figure 8) (Asmahel 2004).          
Snowfall and subsequent snow melt is one of the major sources that feed both the Tigris 
and Euphrates Rivers.  Snowfall distribution differs from the rain precipitation distribution.  





Turkey.  Snowmelt contributes 48% of the Euphrates River’s annual water resources.  The snow 
melt contributes 28.8% of the Tigris River’s annual water resources mostly located in the basin in 
Turkey and the mountainous region in the north and northeastern Iraq, and northwestern Iran.  
The rest of the Tigris and Euphrates River Basins area does not have any significant snow 
precipitation (Asmahel 2004).   
The groundwater resources in the northern part of the Tigris and Euphrates River Basins 
contribute significantly to both Tigris and Euphrates River annual water resources.  Specifically 
during the summer season when precipitation rates are very small these groundwater sources keep 
the rivers flowing.  Groundwater contributes an average of 35.7% to the Euphrates River annually 





and 22.7% to the Tigris River.  The groundwater contribution varies according to the season.  For 
example, during drought years the groundwater contribution is higher and vice versa (Asmahel 
2004).  
According to the Tigris and Euphrates Basins’ population density map in figure 7 (page 
23) and the annual precipitation map in figure 8, the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers have significant 
economic, environmental, and social impacts on all of the riparian nations.  But the impacts on 
Iraq are much greater than the other riparian nations because the majority of the Iraqis depend on 
the water of these two rivers and their 
tributaries (Figure 7).  The greatest direct 
impact of the water shortage issues will 
be felt in south Iraq because of the 
dependency on irrigation for agricultural 
purposes, about 8,000,000 out of 
12,000,000 hectares of Iraqi arable lands 
depends on these two rivers, specifically 
in south Iraq (Asmahel 2004), and higher 
dependence on the Euphrates River, the source of which is completely under the control of 
Turkey.  The situation in north Iraq and the Kurdistan Region is different, because they depend on 
rain for agricultural purposes and depend on the Tigris River which is partially within the 
boundary of Iraq and not controlled completely by another nation like the Euphrates River (see 
Figure 9).  The northern part of Iraq and the Kurdistan Region will be impacted indirectly as a 
result of environmental changes and water shortage in southern Iraq and immigration from the 
damaged regions in the southern regions of Iraq.  






The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) mentioned that Iraq has passed 
through frequent and severe drought seasons for the past three years and has experienced a 
decline of rainfall over the past 5 to 10 years.  Precipitation reached only 25 to 65 percent of 
normal levels as a result of global climate changes (UNDP 2009) and natural factors such as El 
Nino/La Nina cycles off the Pacific coast of South America. 
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report, in the 
middle of the twenty-first century, the Mediterranean basin will suffer a decrease of water 
resources as a result of global climate change.   
The effect of climate change on streamflow and groundwater recharge varies regionally and 
between climate scenarios, largely following projected changes in precipitation. A consistent 
projection across most climate change scenarios is for increases in annual mean streamflow in 
high latitudes and Southeast Asia, and decreases in central Asia, the area around the 
Mediterranean, southern Africa, and Australia (IPCC 2003).   
The Tigris and Euphrates Rivers are located in the same latitude as the Mediterranean 
Basin; therefore it will experience water shortage that will complicate the relationships between 
the riparian nations (Kucukmehmetoglu 2009).  Almost all of the Middle Eastern Countries are 
struggling from the shortage of fresh water availability.  The Middle Eastern Countries including 
the Tigris and Euphrates Riparian Nations are among the most stressed areas in the world 
regarding fresh water availability according to different scenarios of climate change.  The 
following is the fresh water availability per capita (m
3
/capita) in Turkey and Syria:  In 1955 fresh 
water availability in m
3
/capita in Syria and Turkey was 6,501 and 8,508 m
3
/capita, respectively.  
These values were changed to 2,089 and 3,619 m
3
/capita in 1990, and the estimated values for 
2025 and 2050 are 770 and 2,232 m
3
/capita and 546 and 1,910 m
3
/capita, respectively (K. 





Obviously, the land degradation and water scarcity status in both Syria and Turkey is 
damaging Iraq and the situation will get worse over time.  As much as 92% of Iraq’s cultivated 
land is subject to desertification and 71% of irrigated lands are already desertified (K. Haktanir 
2002).  Specific data about scenarios of climate change in Iraq are not available, but according to 
the United Nation Development Program (2009), Iraq is already impacted by climate changes due 
to frequent prolong drought years.   
The data about scenarios of climate change in Turkey can be used to predict these 
changes in Iraq.  Also, these data about Turkey are important because most of the sources of Iraqi 
water are located in Turkey.  The impacts of climate change in Turkey on temperature, 
precipitation, runoff, crop yield, and water stress are predicted according to scenarios of climate 
change, numerical data’s is provided in table 5. 
Table 5: Shows the impacts of climate change on Turkey’s natural resources (K. Haktanir 2002). 
Element Changes with 












3-4 °C increase in the 
annual average 
temperature of Turkey 
from the present day 
(average of the period 
1961-1990) to the 2080s 
2-3 °C increase in the 
annual average 
temperature by the 
2080s 
-3 °C increase in the 
annual average 




0 to -1 mm/day change 
in the annual average 
precipitation by the 
2080s 
0 to -0.5 mm/day change 
in the annual average 
precipitation by the 
2080s 
0 to -0.5 mm/day change 
in the annual average 




No considerable change 
in the vegetation 
biomass (kg/m2) by the 
2080s in response to 
climate change 
No considerable change 
in the vegetation 
biomass (kg/m2) by the 
2080s in response to 
climate change 
No considerable change 
in the vegetation 
biomass (kg/m2) by the 
2080s in response to 
climate change 
Projected % change in 
annual runoff by 
major river basins 
relative to 1961-1990 
20 to 50% decrease in 
annual runoff by the 
2080s 
5% to 25% decrease in 
the annual runoff by the 
2080s 
5% to 25% decrease in 
the annual runoff by the 
2080s 
Projected % change in 
crop yield 
0 to 2.5% change (a 
decrease) in the crop 
yield 
0 to 2.5% change (a 
decrease) in the crop 
yield 
0 to 2.5% change (a 







Iraq will be impacted by climate changes and with greater consequences than Turkey 
because of two reasons.  First, direct impacts of climate change in Iraq on temperature, 
precipitation, vegetation cover change, annual runoff, crop yield production, and other numeric 
data are not available about Iraq can be predicted from table 5 because Iraq and Turkey are 
located in the same region.  Second, these changes (table 5) will prompt Turkey to intensify the 
use of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers’ already scarce water resources, which results in decreased 
water availability in Iraq. 
Land Degradation and Desertification in Iraq 
Land degradation and desertification is not a recent phenomenon in Iraq.  Since ancient 
history, the southern plains in Iraq experienced soil salinity as a result of irrigation and desert 
expansion.  The northern part of Iraq specifically the Kurdistan Region was totally covered by 
forest once, but the region is experiencing deforestation.  The appearance of several civilizations 
and subsequent rapid population growth in Iraq caused depletion of Iraq’s
5
 natural forests during 
the middle ages.  During the eras of the Assyrian, Babylonian, Abbasid, and Umayyad empires, 
the northern Iraq forests were damaged severely.  Timbers harvested from the forests were used 
to build huge palaces for Kings and sultans and thousands of army vehicles especially during 
Assyrian and Babylonian era.  During the Islamic conquests, vast areas of Iraqi forests were 
harvested to provide Islamic armies wood for cooking and heating purposes (Hussien Kariem, 
Abdulmahdi Jbr 2008). 
In 1492, the Ottoman Empire practiced a mass harvesting of the existing forests in order 
to build the warships as a result of the wars that the empire were involved in and to build 
merchant fleets.  The remaining forests in northern Iraq were damaged severely by unsustainable 
harvesting by individuals because the regional authorities were too weak to enforce laws until 
                                                             





1734 when the first legislation stated by the Ottoman authorities.  More legislation and actions 
had been taken in order to improve the forests during the Ottoman Empire because of the Empire 
were done with its wars in European side of the Empire and it started controlling its territory 
again.  In 1900 the law of reforestation was enacted, and in 1913 the forestry police department 
was established.  But a few years later, when the Ottoman Empire was defeated in World War I, 
the Iraqi region was controlled by British and French armies.  Therefore, the forests were 
damaged as a result of unsustainable harvesting by individuals because there were not strong 
regional authorities to enforce laws until 1936 when the Department of Forestry was established 
as a part of the agricultural ministry.  In 1957 the Iraqi forestry police department was established 
(Hussien Kariem, Abdulmahdi Jbr 2008).    
The previous damage to Iraqi forests was significant.  The majority of Iraqi forests were 
depleted as a result of the human actions through the previous centuries.  To date, the situation in 
the forest areas is very critical.  From the mid-1930s up to 1991, the very small remaining forest 
areas in the mountains were the main battlefields between Kurds and Iraqi governments because 
Kurds were refused to be a part of Iraq and demanded autonomous region in Iraq or an 
independent nation of Kurdistan.  From 1994 to 1998, the forested areas were the battlefield of 
the Kurds civil war between Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan in 
order to control power in the autonomous region of Kurdistan after Saddam was defeated in the 
First Gulf War.  In recent days, the northern region of Iraq, where most of the remaining Iraqi 
forests are located is bombarded frequently by Turkey’s and Iran’s armies because the Kurdistan 
Labor Party (PKK) Guerillas are sheltering there.  As a result of these actions, the mountainous 
and hilly regions in northern Iraq are severely damaged by erosion and forest fires as a result of 
military actions, having lost their ability to regenerate naturally especially in the regions that are 





The continuing drought that is affecting Middle Eastern countries, as well as the water 
scarcity in the southern part of Iraq resulting from the impeded flow of the Tigris and Euphrates 
Rivers due to upstream countries, complicates the availability of arable land and environmental 
condition in the northern part of 
Iraq.  The green covers in southern 
Iraq have significantly decreased, 
especially with the palm farms and 
marshlands.  Therefore, the desert 
expansion process has accelerated 
and moves toward the northern 
part of the country.  Recent dust 
storms further demonstrate this 
acceleration, as they have affected 
the region in a manner that never 
happened in the past.  Figures 9 and 10 show the characteristics of land use in whole Iraq and the 







Figure 10: Shows the Iraq’s Land Use map.  Source: (Global 
Security 2010) 






Turkish Economic Exploitation of Basin Water Resources 
The Tigris and Euphrates Rivers have significant economic value for the riparian nations 
because of the high dependency on these two rivers for irrigation, hydropower plants and the 
population density in these two river basins.  In case of Iraq the value of these two rivers are 
extremely significant, without these two rivers almost all of the central and southern Iraq are not 
suitable for living.   As a result of population growth and water scarcity the riparian nations 
developed different strategies in order to meet their population demands regarding power and 
food. Turkey’s exploitation of the Tigris and Euphrates is of special concern because of its 
upstream control of these rivers (Kucukmehmetoglu 2009). 
Since 1970 Turkish authorities started to develop the southeastern Anatolian region 
where the Tigris & Euphrates Basins are located. The need to increase agricultural lands and 
provide energy for expanding urban areas in the last fifteen years has led to increasing the number 
of dams and reservoirs through the Southeastern Anatolia project (GAP).  Regional concern 
started when Turkish authorities began implementing the GAP project for two reasons: (1) 
intensified water use in the upstream parts of the basin, and (2) the majority of precipitation that 
feed both the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers fall in Turkey.       
GAP is one of the biggest regional and world projects located in southeastern Turkey.  
This is a multi-sector project including: agriculture, industry, transportation, telecommunication, 
education, urban and rural infrastructure, housing, tourism and environment.  The purpose of 
GAP is to develop the overall economy in the GAP region and the rest of Turkey.  The GAP 
project includes thirteen regional projects; seven of them in the Euphrates River Basin and six in 
the Tigris River Basin.  The main component of these projects is dams.  The overall numbers of 
dams and hydropower plants that are completed, under construction, and planned are 22 dams and 





Tigris and Euphrates Basins.  The GAP project area is 75,358 Sq. km, which is 9.63% of 
Turkey’s area, bigger than the area of Holland and Belgium together (Balat 2003) (Asmahel 
2004). 
The main outputs of the GAP project are increasing the irrigated agricultural area to 
about 1.7 million hectares in Anatolia dry lands, producing more than 7.5 GW of electric power, 
and storing 128 billion m
3
 of water in reservoirs.  The agricultural purpose is the major objective 
of this project.  Turkey wants this project to: 
1- Stop immigration from rural areas to urban areas. 
2- Improve the people’s income in the region. 
3- Increase employment opportunities in both agricultural fields and agro industries. 
4- Make Anatolia flat land a food basket for all of the Middle Eastern and former Soviet 
Union nations.   
5- Develop attractive socio-economic conditions in the GAP region and in the rest of the 
country. 
But the agricultural development efforts lead to some negative impacts on environmental 
conditions in the GAP region regarding the loss of some native species and losses of biodiversity 
through implementing monoculture systems (Balat 2003) (Asmahel 2004). 
The reasons that forced Turkey, recently,  to put more efforts to manage its water 
resources is the increase of grain (wheat and barley) prices as a result of drought seasons that 
damaged different regions in the world, specifically the Middle East.  Downstream countries 
complain that Turkey, through implementation of the GAP project, does not provide them a fair 
share of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, while Turkey stated that the GAP project provides free 
benefits regarding flood control to the downstream nations (Syria and Iraq) (Ünal Öziş, Yalçın 





The precipitation in Turkey is not equally distributed throughout the year.  The amount of 
precipitation varies during seasons and from year to year.  Therefore, Turkish authorities stated 
that the GAP project is not damaging Syria and Iraq but rather will assist all the basin nations 
regarding sediment retention, flood mitigation and temporary low flow augmentation during 
drought seasons through using stored water (Ünal Öziş, Yalçın Özdemir 2009).  
The expected/projected/anticipated natural water shortage as a result of global climate 
change and the increased demand for fresh water in order to meet the economic and population 
growth in Turkey is expected to lead to decreased water availability downstream, especially for 
irrigation, in Syria and  Iraq.  The Iraqi ministry of water resources, in the last meeting with the 
Turkey’s authority in 2009, stated that his country is experiencing a massive emigration from 
rural areas to big cities as a result of water scarcity (Aljazeera B 2009). 
Conclusion  
The change of legal case of the Tigris and Euphrates River from internal to international 
watercourses by the end of the World War I stimulated a need for agreements between/among 
riparian nations.  To date, the core problem among the Tigris and Euphrates riparian nations is the 
lack of tripartite agreement. However, several bilateral treaties and agreements exit between 
riparian nations but these bilateral treaties and agreements are not effective because these rivers 
are shared by more than two nations.  Since there is no enforce international law to be 
implemented to share the Tigris and Euphrates River among riparian nations and no effective 
tripartite agreements exist among riparian nations, each nation defines these rivers differently.   
For example, Turkey insists that these two rivers are Turkish river, Iraq and Syria both stated that 
these two rivers are international watercourses in addition to debating among riparian nations 





However, the issue of making a tripartite agreement among riparian nations is further 
complicated by non fresh water related problems (regarding political and security problems), 
rapid growth of population and water decline as projected by climatic change scenarios.  The 
majority of the Tigris and Euphrates basins area are located in arid and semi arid region and 
therefore the water balance is negative in over 95% of the basins area.  Therefore, further 
effective uses of water resources in upstream nations are expected.  The implementation of 
Southeastern Anatolian Project (GAP) in Turkey is the main evidence of such effective use of 
water in Turkey.  The use of water resources in upstream nations specifically Turkey is a big 
problem for downstream nations, specifically Iraq, because Turkey has a control of these two 
river water resources, specifically the Euphrates, as a result of its upstream position.  The fact that 
the majority of Iraqi arable lands, over 70%, depends on these two rivers make Iraq extremely 
vulnerable to desertification and land degradation as a result of fluctuation and shortage of water 





Land Cover, Land Use, and Soil Erosion in Iraq 
This chapter provides details about geographic, climatic, land use and land degradation in 
Iraq, specifically north Iraq.  Details are provided to visualize the region and the land degradation 
problems in different parts of Iraq, specifically north Iraq.  The provided details are significant to 
identify the type of land degradation, such as salinazation and erosion, in Iraq and to visualize 
vulnerable regions to desertification.  Also, climatic details, such as temperature and rainfall, and 
topographic details, such as slopes and elevation, that are provided in this chapter assist in 
selecting appropriate solutions in chapter seven (Strategies to Combat Desertification in Iraq and 
the Kurdistan Region) for each region in Iraq. 
Generally, this chapter identifies a few major details about Iraq as follows: (1) 
precipitation in Iraq varies from northern region, up to 1000 mm, toward southern region, below 
100 mm, (2) gap of elevation is significant, ranging from over 2000 m in north to below zero in 
south, and annual temperature, 0 - -4 C in top north (over 2000 m above sea level) to 25 – 30 C in 
south, and (3) north of Iraq is chiefly damaged by water erosion as a result of rainfall erosivity 
and soil erodibility factors and south of Iraq by salinazation. 
Iraq is divided into three different natural zones: mountains, desert, and the great 
Mesopotamia plains (upper plain and lower plain).  The mountain region is located in the north 
and east, while the desert areas are located in the south and west.  The great Mesopotamia plain is 
surrounded by desert area on the south and west, and mountains in the north and east.  The upper 
Mesopotamian plain is comprised mostly of non-irrigated, rain fed farms while the lower 
Mesopotamian plain is primarily dominated by irrigated fields (Figure 9 - page 26).  The climate 





regions, (2) continental, and (3) sub- tropical semi- arid.  The average rainfall is 216 mm but the 
range varies from northern toward southern regions.  The rainfall range is about 1200 mm in the 
northeastern region while it is about 100 mm in the southern region, which includes 
approximately 60% of Iraq.  The rainy season occurs in north and northeastern regions in the 
winter from November to April, while in the other parts of the country the rainy season occurs 
from December to February (FAO 2009).      
The land uses in Iraq vary according to the topography and climatic conditions.  As 
shown in figure 10 (page 31), forests and pastures cover the mountainous region in the north and 
some parts of the east.  The northern Iraqi hilly plains and flat land are located below the 
mountainous region, indicated by brown color, and include most of the Iraqi rain fed, non-
irrigated, arable lands, which provide the main source of grains, primarily wheat and barley.  The 
lower Mesopotamian plains are located in between the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers in the central 
and south of Iraq,  These plains include most of Iraq’s irrigated lands, which produce different 
types of agricultural products such as wheat, barley, rice, vegetables, and dates.  The rest of the 
south-western and the western regions are dominated by desert (Figures 9 – page 26 & 10 – page 
31).    
The elevation level in Iraq varies from north to south, from up to 3000 meters above sea 
level at the top northern mountainous region to zero meters in the southern region.  Generally, the 
altitude decreases gradually from the northern regions toward the southern regions (Figure 13).  
The temperature patterns also vary from the northern regions toward the southern regions.  In the 
northern mountainous regions in the areas where the elevation averages over 2000 m, the average 
annual temperature ranges between -4 and 0 Celsius degrees.  While in most of the middle and 
southern Iraq is ranged between 20.5 and 30 Celsius degrees.  Generally, the temperature 










      
 
                       
Iraq has about 48,000,000 dounums or 12,000,000 hectares of agricultural land.  Of that, 
8,000,000 hectares are located in the Southern Region and 4,000,000 hectares in the Northern 
Region.  Only about 21%, or 2,517, 000 hectares, of Iraq’s agricultural lands are located in non-
irrigated areas.  Only 20% or 497,000 hectares are located in the areas likely to receive enough 
Figure 12: Shows the average annual temperature in Iraq (FAO 2010). 





rain for growing crops, and the rest of it is located in the marginal areas or semi likely to receive 
enough rain for growing crops, 610, 000 hectares, and the areas unlikely to receive enough 
rainfall for growing crops, 1,410,000.  The variation of rainfall is + 30% or -30% of the overall 
precipitation in the marginal areas and unlikely areas to receive enough rain for growing crops 
therefore some of these lands are supported by supplementary irrigation systems in order to be 
agriculturally viable (Asmahel 2004) (Nhma 2009). 
Land Characteristics in Northern Iraq 
The area of northern Iraq and Kurdistan Region is about 12,000,000 hectares including 
forest, pasture, waste and dry crop lands.  
The region is divided into three different 
zones according to the mean rainfall 
amounts: (1) high rainfall zones (above 
600 mm), (2) medium rainfall zones 
(between 400 mm and 600 mm), and (3) 
low rainfall zones (below 400 mm).  
Generally, the northern Iraq region has a 
semi-arid Mediterranean climate.  The 
temperature pattern varies from summer to winter by about 20 Celsius degrees.  During winter 
months, minimum daily temperature drops below the freezing point, while in summer the 
maximum daily temperature is above 35˚C and sometimes reach 45 ˚C or above especially in the 
southern region of North Iraq (Hussein, Water erosion assessment and control in Northern Iraq 
1998).    
Figure 14: Shows the nature of land uses in North Iraq and 
Kurdistan Region (Hussein, Water erosion assessment and 





Figure 14 shows more specific details about land uses in the Kurdistan Region and North 
Iraq.
6
 As shown in figure 14, almost all of the Iraqi degraded forest areas, about 1,500,000 
hectares, are located in the north and northeastern regions characterized by high mean annual 
rainfall with hilly and steep topography.  The area of dryland farming in North Iraq is about 
2,000,000 hectares, with 60% located in the low rainfall zones.  Dryland farming (crop land) as 
indicated in figure 14 is practiced within the boundary of likely and unlikely areas to receive 
enough rain for growing crops. The topography in the dry land farm area is level to rolling.  The 
grazing areas exist in all the rainfall zones; it covers about 2,000,000 hectares of the land 
(Hussein 1998).   
Different types of soil exist in North Iraq and the Kurdistan Region.  The low rainfall 
zone is dominated by Aridisols.  Vertisols, Mollisols, and Aridisols are found in the high and 
medium rainfall zones. These two zones are usually used for dryland farming.  Entisols exist in 
the more sloped regions.  Generally soil depth is less than 1 meter for both Aridisols and Entisols, 
while it reaches 1.5 meters for both Vertisols and Mollisols (Hussein, Water erosion assessment 
and control in Northern Iraq 1998).  Aridisols are a dry soil with low organic matter components, 
covered sparsely by salt or drought tolerant plants.  In order to be agriculturally viable it needs 
supplementary irrigation.  Vertisols are a clay rich soil best suited for pasture lands and plants 
that thrive in standing surface water.  Vertisols are characterized by low water permeability.  
Mollisols are characterized by high concentration of humus in it and are highly arable and 
suitable for cereals and grains.   Entisols are formed from the recent geological actions and are 
resistant to weather characteristic, usually found in areas of active erosion (Encyclopedia 
Britannica 2010).    
                                                             





The nature of slopes in Northern Iraq and Kurdistan Region, as shown in figure 15, varies 
from region to region.  
Generally the north and 
northeastern regions are 
dominated by steep 
slopes, while the middle 
and southern regions of 
North Iraq have variable 
slopes from nearly level, 
gently rolling to rolling, hilly, hilly to steep, and steep, though not mountainous  (Figure 15).  
 
 
Table 6: shows the meaning of the symbols that are used in figure 15 (Hussein 1998). 
 
Symbol Class Range of Slope (%) 
A Nearly Level 0 - 5 
AB Level 0 – 10 
B Rolling to rolling 5 - 10 
C Hilly 10 - 30 
CD Hilly to steep Greater then 10 
D Steep Greater than 30 





The rainfall erosivity 
in North Iraq and Kurdistan 
Region varies from north to 
south.  As shown in figure 16, 
units are the potential erosive 
force of runoff as determined 
by the average slope and 
intensity of the rainfall.  The 
higher the number, the greater 
the erosive force of the rainfall and runoff.  Generally, the rainfall erosivity decreases gradually 
from the northern regions toward the southern regions (Figure 16).  The erosivity depends on the 
season and the topographic characteristic of the land.  For example, the rainfall erosivity 
decreases in dry seasons.  Also the force of rainfall erosivity depends on the land’s slope classes 
and rain intensity (Hussein 1996).   The season, especially in croplands, has significant impacts 
on the rainfall erosivity.  For example, during spring season the rainfall erosivity is higher 
because the vegetation cover is minimal, soils are saturated, and snow is melting (C.S. Baldwin 
2003).        
The soil erodibility in North Iraq and the Kurdistan Region is different from region to 
region depending on the regional characteristics such as topography, soil type, rainfall, and land 
use activities.  The map of soil erodibility in North Iraq and Kurdistan Region is shown in figure 
17 (Figure 17).   The degree of soil erodibility depends on the soil type and properties such as 
infiltration rate, organic matter continent, and structure.  For example, soil is more resistant to 
erosion if it has a faster rate of infiltration, high level of organic matter, and good structure.  Also, 
some types of soil such as silt, very fine sand, and certain clays, are more erodible than other 
types such as sand, sandy loam and loam.  Agricultural practices also have impacts on soil 






erodibility through lowering organic matter in soil and decreasing the quality of soil structure, 
which leads to compact land surface and increasing erodibility (C.S. Baldwin 2003).            
  
Table 7: Shows water erosion classification used in Northern Iraq (Hussein 1998).  This table is used as a 
guideline for both figures 17 above & 18 below 
Symbol Description Typical Annual Soil Loss 
(ton/ha) 
1 None to slight 0 – 5 
2 Slight to moderate 5 – 10 
3 Moderate to severe 10 – 50 
4 Severe 50 – 100 
5 Very severe Greater than 100 






Figure 18 shows the water erosion and land conditions in North Iraq and the Kurdistan 
Region.  It is clear from the description of each unit in the map that the erosion exists all over the 
region.  The southern region of North Iraq is more vulnerable to desertification because: (1) as 
indicated previously, the southern region of North Iraq is located in the low rainfall zones, (2) 
land use is dominated by dryland farming and grazing areas, which are prone to overuse 
problems, and (3) geographically, it is located next to the Iraqi desert.  But, as shown in figure 18, 





erosion and land degradation exist all over the region.  Therefore, the northern region might be 
less impacted by desertification in the short term but it will be impacted severely in the long term 
unless appropriate policies and techniques are followed to manage the lands in a sustainable way.  
Current dust storms, figures 22 & 23 (page 60), are the main evidence for acceleration of desert 
expansion from the southern region of Iraq toward the north.   
Conclusion 
The land degradation in northern Iraq, specifically the Kurdistan Region, is chiefly 
caused by water erosion because steep slopes, nature of the land and intense rainfall along with 
lack of vegetative cover increases rainfall erosivity and soil erodibility.  The degree of rainfall 
erosivity decreases from northern region toward southern region of north Iraq.  The southern part 
of north Iraq is dominated by marginal lands that are characterized by low annual rainfall (200 – 
400 mm) and therefore are prone to overgrazing and overuse problems, which in turn results to 
increase the vulnerability of land to erosion.  It can be concluded in this chapter that the most 
important driving cause of land degradation in north Iraq are water erosion, overgrazing and 
overuse of marginal lands.  Therefore any efforts to solve land degradation and desertification 




Factors that Lead to Desertification 
This chapter provides details about driving factors of desertification including 
demographic, economic, technological, government policy, climatic and deforestation.  Also, 
details is provided about  unique local factors contributing to land degradation and desertification 
in Iraq and the Kurdistan Region, including armed conflict, deliberate destruction of natural 
resources, and UN economic sanctions
7
 against Iraq.  Studying the role of these factors assists to 
identify the major critical causes of desertification in Iraq.  
The major findings in this chapter are the consequences of population growth and 
economic development to accelerate land degradation.  For example, the population growth in 
Iraq leads to intensify use of available lands and move toward utilizing ecologically unsustainable 
low productive lands to meet the needs of agricultural products.  Also, economic growth results in 
urban expansion onto fertilizer lands, which in turn encourages utilizing marginal lands for crop 
production through using irrigation systems and chemical fertilizers to compensate the loss of 
fertile lands around urban centers.  However, the marginal lands are ecologically unsustainable 
for growing crops, which in turn results in degrading these lands in the future.  The upstream 
nations, specifically Turkey, water management policy through building dams and expanding 
irrigated areas declined the amount of water that Iraq receives.  Therefore, these upstream nations 
policy further damage Iraqi degraded environment and worsen Iraqi land condition.  61% of Iraqi 
arable lands are subject to salinity problems and 92% of Iraqi lands are subject to desertification 
                                                             
7 ―The UN Security Council imposed comprehensive economic sanctions against Iraq on August 6, 
1990, just after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. When the coalition war had ousted Iraq from Kuwait the 
following year, the Council did not lift the sanctions, keeping them in place as leverage to press for 






(K. Haktanir 2002).  The overall condition is further complicated by the climatic problems such 
as drought and its consequences.  The economic growth in the Kurdistan Region stimulated 
efforts to develop agricultural sector through implementing a plan to meet food self sufficiency 
and be a net exporter of agricultural products may stimulate establishing advanced monoculture 
systems, which contribute to land degradation and desertification in long term.                
 Demographic Factors 
The growth of human population is leading to increasing population in urban areas, 
accelerating cropland expansion, and rising livestock populations.  Cropland expansion causes a 
loss of the natural green cover that protect the land from erosion.  The ongoing conversion of 
range and forest lands to monoculture cropland decreases land productivity in short term and land 
degradation in long term.  The increase of livestock populations has caused overgrazing, which 
accelerates soil erosion and land degradation (Houérou 2002)  (Helmut J. Geist , Eric F. Lambin 
2004). 
The demographic factor is leading to ―desertization or human made desert‖ (Houérou 
2002).  Desertization as defined 
by Le Houérou is the present 
irreversible degradation of arid 
lands, turned into man-made 
deserts.  The increase of human 
and livestock population, along 
with the mismanagement of the 
soil and water resources, results 
in desertization especially in 
arid and semi-arid regions.  The 
Figure 19: Shows the role of demographic changes to promote desertification 






demographic related problems are increasing in many parts of the world as a result of rapid 
population growth, which puts more pressure on using lands.  Figure 19 shows the consequences 
of demographic factors on desertification processes (Houérou 2002).  
As shown in figure 19, the growth of human and livestock populations will lead to 
increased fuelwood collection, medicinal plant collection, overgrazing, and inappropriate use of 
resources or poor resource management.  These in turn result in declining natural green cover.  
The poor resource management causes increased soil salinity, soil alkalinity, and reducing soil 
productivity, which leads to changes in soil structure.  The destruction of natural green cover 
leads to accelerated erosion, soil compaction, and a change in soil structure and salinity.  The 
change in soil structure and salinity leads to increased sedimentation and water logging 
alkalization.  Almost all of the mentioned consequences of the human and livestock population 
growth are leading to accelerated land degradation and desertification. 
  The reinforcing or positive feedbacks loops (R)
8
 imply that the land condition will 
worsen over time.  R1 shows the decline of natural green cover causes acceleration of the change 
in soil structure and salinity, which leads to more declines in natural green covers in a positive 
feedback loop.  R2 shows the decline of natural green cover causes accelerated erosion, land 
degradation and desertification which lead to more decline in natural green covers in a positive 
feedback loop.  R3, R4, and R5 have the same impacts on land degradation and desertification as 
R1 has through accelerating soil compaction, sedimentation, and water logging alkalization 
respectively (Figure 19).  
                                                             
8 There are two types of feedback loops, reinforcing and balancing feedback loop.  Reinforcing feedback 
loop (R) ―tend to reinforce or amplify whatever is happening in the system, for example, the more nuclear 
weapon NATO deployed during the cold war, the more the Soviet Union built, leading NATO to build still 
more (Sterman 2000).‖  Balancing feedback loop (B) ―is a feedback loop in which changes anywhere in the 
loop propagate around the loop to ―UNDO‖ original change (Deaton 2009),‖ for example, ―the more 
attractive a neighborhood or city, the greater the in migration from surrounding areas will be, increasing 
unemployment, housing prices, crowding in the schools, and traffic congestion until it is no more attractive 






The human pressure on the arable lands in Iraq is noticeable through intensifying uses of 
arable lands as a result of population growth.  The following are data’s about land availability per 
capita overtime in Iraq: between 1981 and 1983, the available arable land per capita was 0.4 
hectare, between 1991 and 1993 this area decreased to 0.3 hectares (UNEP 1997).  In 2005 and 
2007 the arable land availability per capita further declined to 0.19 and 0.17 hectare respectively 
(The World Bank 2010).  The major losses of arable lands caused by the following consequences 
of population growth: (1) Large agricultural areas close to the urban centers have been lost 
because of urbanization, industrialization, and transportation infrastructure, (2) To provide more 
land for agricultural purposes in order to compensate the lands that has been lost regarding 
urbanization, marginal lands has been reclaimed for agricultural purposes, (3) The land of low 
productivity is being overused as herds overgraze rangelands, (4) Irrigated lands is being used all 
year round through using more water, chemical fertilizers and pesticides, and (5) The increased 
population and agricultural activities resulted in increasing demand for water and caused 
overusing ground water, which in turn resulted in soil salinazation and destruction of plant and 
animal habitats (UNEP 1997).             
 Economic Factors 
Economic factors are some of 
the major causes of desertification in 
different parts of the world.  
Urbanization, commercialization, 
industrialization, and market growth are 
creating a perfect atmosphere prompting 
the farmers to overuse the land by using 
different types of technologies such as irrigation systems and chemical fertilizers.  For example, 
Figure 20: Shows the role of economical factors on land 







external high demands for strategic agricultural commodities, such as grains, beef and cotton, 
along with the lack of labor, land scarcity, and low investment potential are leading the farmers to 
overuse their lands (Helmut J. Geist , Eric F. Lambin 2004).  
In other cases, when the demand for agricultural products increases, farmers will move to 
adapt range and forest lands to agricultural fields in order to increase food production and to 
harvest more wood from the forest in order to export it.  Nepal nationalized forest lands in 1957 
in order to increase food production through adapting forest land to agricultural fields and 
improve its economy through exporting harvested wood (A.P. Gautam 2004); this serves as a 
perfect example of this case because it led to increased agricultural production in the short term 
but resource depletion and land degradation or desertification in the long term (Figure 20 above). 
Turkey’s economic ambitions are a good example of such a case in the Tigris and 
Euphrates River basin.  As a result of increasing demands for food and agricultural products all 
over the world, Turkish authorities wish to be the major producer of food and agricultural 
products for both the Middle East and the Central Asian region through increasing irrigated lands 
in the Tigris and Euphrates River Basin (Asmahel 2004) (Ünal Öziş, Yalçın Özdemir 2009). 
 The Kurdistan Regional Government is following a five-year plan (2010 – 2014) to 
develop the agricultural sector in the region.  It is worth mentioning that until the 1970s 
agricultural products were being exported from the Kurdistan Region to the rest of Iraq and 
neighboring countries, but this situation severely changed as a result of wars and conflicts.  
Currently the Kurdistan Regional Government through taking advantages from economic 
development and security stability, compared with the other parts of Iraq, in the region is 
implementing a five-year plan from 2010 to 2014 to redevelop the agricultural sector.  The goals 
are meeting food self sufficiency within five years and being a net exporter of agricultural 





implemented or established are 1865 projects with a total investment of $10,221,297,000 within 
five years (2010 – 2014).  However, the plan includes moving from small agricultural farms to 
larger farms through tapping water form aquifers, providing subsidized irrigation systems and 
chemical fertilizers (Kurdistan Regional Government - Ministry of Planning 2009).  Generally, 
these governmental subsidies are leading to overusing of agricultural lands and developing 
monoculture systems.  The fact that the Kurdistan Region is suffering from the lack of enough 
agricultural expertise and skilled farmers will further increase the vulnerability of land 
degradation due to misuse of the provided irrigation systems and land resources.  Since ancient 
history, the urban centers were built on the fertile lands.  Therefore any expansion of urban 
centers will be onto the fertile lands (UNEP 1997).  Currently in the Kurdistan Region, the capital 
city, Arbil, is expanding rapidly as a result of economic growth.  Of course, this expansion will 
take fertile arable lands around the city.  The concern is with the 2010 to 2014 plan; the need for 
lands to be used for agricultural purposes is increasing.  Therefore, more use of marginal lands 
and overuse of available agricultural lands are expected. 
 Technology Factors 
The use of modernization theory and Misuse of heavy agricultural technologies in 
managing water and land is one of the major causal factors of desertification.  These 
technological innovations include the development of the land and water resource management 
through small projects at the village level such as motor pumps and boreholes, or through larger 
projects such as dams, reservoirs, canals, collectors and artificial drainage networks.  The lack of 
maintenance on these systems is causing major losses of the water in addition to causing drastic 
changes in the natural hydrographic network through altering the direction of water flows.  The 
Aral Sea disaster is one of the best examples of the role of misusing technologies that accelerates 
land degradation through altering natural systems.  The former USSR implemented very extreme 





the two rivers that discharge in the Aral Sea in order to irrigate more lands.   The results were 
disastrous changes that happened in both hydrological and environmental systems all over the 
basin.  Overtime the Aral Sea almost disappeared and now only a very small part of it remains 
(Saiko 2000).    
The current implementation of water resource management technologies through 
impounding water and diverting water courses to irrigate Anatolian drylands by Turkey’s 
government is the best equivalent example of the Aral Sea case in the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers 
Basin.  Turkey is following the same strategies, diverting river courses to increase irrigated lands, 
that the former Soviet Union followed in the Aral Sea Basin in order to increase irrigated land 
and agriculture production.  The details about Turkey’s water management strategies were 
provided in chapter one – GAP section.  Also, the withdrawal of water from Mesopotamia’s 
marshlands in southern Iraq by Saddam Hussein’s regime to promote agricultural production in 
the same region is another equivalent example of the Aral Sea case in the Tigris and Euphrates 
Rivers Basin.  Through intensifying irrigation in southern Iraq, Hussein’s regime drained the 
Mesopotamian marshlands.  Even as recently 1970s the Mesopotamian marshlands covered 
20,000 km
2 
in Southern Iraq.  In addition to expanding irrigation lands, Hussein intentionally 
dried the marshlands to force those who were living there to move and to relocate them because 
of their political views
9
.  Also, the building of dams in Turkey, Syria, Iran and Iraq itself has a 
significant impact on the shrinking of the Mesopotamian marshlands through decreasing the 
amount of water that discharges in theses marshlands.  The marshlands were a very special 
ecosystem in the southern part of Iraq but now only 10 – 15% of these marshlands remain.  
Figure 21(page 58) shows the change of Mesopotamian marshland condition since 1973.  The 
dark red color represents the density of vegetation cover (Middleton 2005) (Figure 21 – page 58). 
                                                             





 The technological development in Iraq has contributes to changing land use and land 
degradation.  For example, in south-central irrigation zone investment in water storage and flood 
control projects along with adoption of irrigation pumps resulted in expanding irrigated area 
rather than productivity.  Due to mismanagement and lack of maintaining irrigation projects, soil 
salinazation damaged large areas.  In northern Iraq, the arrival of tractors rapidly expanded 
cultivated areas to marginal lands.  Such expansion of agricultural fields were ecological 
unsustainable because the majority of marginal lands are not getting sufficient rain for growing 
agricultural crops and they are serving as grazing and rangelands (Congressional Research 
Service 2004).   
 Policy Factor 
  Iraq’s government policies regarding land management have significant impacts on the 
change of land cover and land surface.  The purpose of government policies are to improve 
agricultural production through agricultural intensification methods, and converting forest and 
rangelands to agricultural fields in response to national economic development and globalization 
(Elsevier Science Ltd 2001) (Helmut J. Geist , Eric F. Lambin 2004).  These policies include 
agricultural reforms, methods of agricultural intensification per unit area, market liberalization, 
developing big agricultural projects and changing the land tenure policies.  These policies are 
considered a significant factor that has driven desertification all over the world (Helmut J. Geist , 
Eric F. Lambin 2004) including Iraq and Kurdistan Region.  
Both the deforestation case in Nepal and the Aral Sea disaster are extreme examples of 
the policies that have inadvertently promoted desertification and land degradation.  The Aral Sea 
details were provided in above.  In Nepal the government implemented policies to extract more 





increased timber exports and agricultural products in the short term but deforestation and land 
degradation in the longer term (A.P. Gautam 2004). 
The situation in the Tigris and Euphrates River basin differs from the Nepal deforestation 
case but it is closer to the Aral Sea case.  In the Tigris and Euphrates River Basin, the policy in 
any country, especially upstream countries, will influence those downstream.  For example, any 
policies to manage water and lands in Turkey, Syria and Iran will have negative impacts on Iraq’s 
hydrological and environmental system.  In addition to the impacts of the upstream country’s 
policies on Iraq’s land structure, building of dams in Turkey, Syria, Iran and Iraq itself has a 
significant impact on the shrinking of the Mesopotamian marshlands through decreasing the 
amount of water that discharges in theses marshlands (Middleton 2005), some of the other 
internal policies in both of the woodlands in the northern portion of Iraq and Mesopotamia’s 
marshland in southern Iraq during Saddam’s administration have significant roles in causing 
expansion of deserts and accelerating land degradation all over Iraq.  
 Climatic Factors 
The increase of greenhouse gas emissions and aerosols in the atmosphere result from 
different human activities since the beginning of industrial age.  Burning fossil fuels and changes 
in land cover are major causes that contribute to the greater concentration of atmospheric 
properties that absorb radiant energy.  These changes in atmospheric properties are causing 
significant alteration in the factors on which human systems and natural environments depend, 
such as precipitation and temperature.  These changes also induce extreme climate events, sea 
level rise, and desertification especially in arid and semi-arid regions (Sivakumar 2006).  Iraq’s 
atmosphere is severely polluted as a result of burning fossil fuels and other problems such as wars 
and destruction of marshlands (Al-Attar 2004). The following are major sources of pollution in 





(Pb), (5) Ozone, (6) Nitrogen oxide (Nox), (7) Suspended particulate matter (SPM), and (8) 
Sulfur dioxide (So2).  Therefore, the identified consequences of changing atmospheric properties 
above are applicable to Iraq and the Kurdistan Region too. 
Decreasing rainfall is one of the significant factors that simultaneously marks and 
intensifies desertification in different parts of the world.  Also, climate change exacerbates 
desertification through changing of the spatial and temporal patterns of rainfall in different parts 
of the globe (Sivakumar 2006).  The variation of rainfall amounts causes changes in land cover 
through both lengthening number of dry years or seasons, resulting in very long drought periods, 
such as a drought that damaged Sudan from 1960s to 1990s (Helmut J. Geist , Eric F. Lambin 
2004). 
The increase of global temperatures as a result of climate change results in changing: (1) 
soil properties and processes, such as organic matter decomposition, greater leaching losses, and 
decreased soil water, (2) soil erosion and degradation through reducing soil moisture, and (3) 
erosion in some regions because of heavy rainfall and increased windspeed (IPCC 2003).  Also, 
climate change accelerates desertification through changing the regional water resources and 
wetland systems this occurs by disrupting the balance between water outflow and inflow because 
of the variation of rainfall amounts and increasing temperature, which enhances evaporation.  
These changes will lead to decreasing lake and reservoir sizes, to drying wetlands and to 
changing regional environments (Sivakumar 2006).            
The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) mentioned that Iraq has passed 
through frequent and severe drought seasons for the past three years and has experienced a 
decline of rainfall over the past 5 to 10 years.  Precipitation reached only 25 to 65 percent of 
normal levels as a result of global climate changes and natural factors such as El Nino/La Nina 





increase the likelihood of massive dust storms as a result of losing soil moisture and vegetation 
cover.  The impacts of climate change are expected to become more severe as time passes, which 
will lead to more destruction of physical and chemical characteristic of soil in Iraq’s arable and 
non-arable lands (UNDP 2009).  
In the past drought issues and dust storms were very rare in the Kurdistan Region.  The 
problem of drought started roughly in the last 10 to 15 years as a result of global climate change.  
Currently, the Kurdistan Region faces an unpredictable climate due to changes in rainfall 
amounts, changes in rainfall times, dust storms, and rising average temperatures.  Climate change 
has significant impact on land use, land cover, and water resources in this region.  For example 
the change in rainfall amounts and the distribution of rainfall times forced the farmers to depend 
more on irrigation systems, which led to reduced ground water levels, increasing soil erosion and 
salinity, changing soil structure, and decreasing soil moisture.  For example, in 1996 under the 
UN – Iraq ―oil for food‖ program, the number of wells increased in the Kurdistan Region through 
FAO efforts to solve water scarcity and drought problems.  The increased number of wells led to 
sharp decline in ground water in some parts of the Kurdistan Region.  This in turn resulted in 
drying some natural springs in areas sharing the same aquifer with the newly established wells 
which forced those who depend on these natural springs to leave and a reduction of vegetative 
cover occurred.  These changes of the soil and natural properties in the Kurdistan Region made 
the region more vulnerable to dust storms and climate change (Hamza 2009)  (UNDP 2009). 
 Deforestation and Rangeland Modification factors 
Multiple factors lead to deforestation, including population growth, poverty (A. S. 
MATHER 2000), economic development, national policy, agricultural expansion, international 
trade growth, technological development (Rudel 1993), private property regimes, access rights, 





rangeland destruction along with other factors such as overgrazing (Sivakumar 2006).  This thesis 
does not provide a deep explanation about causal factors of deforestation and rangeland 
destruction, but pays particular attention to the roles of deforestation and rangeland destruction 
(land cover change) to promote desertification.  
   The estimate of land cover change worldwide since 1850 through deforestation, 
rangeland modification, and agricultural expansion suggests that about 6 million km
2 
of forest and 
woodlands and 4.7 million km
2
 of savanna and grasslands have been converted to cropland (N. 
Ramankutty and J.A. Foley 1999).  The change in land cover through adapting forest and 
rangelands to croplands is one of the major driving factors of lands degradation (Sivakumar 
2006).  Also, adapting forest and rangelands to cropland depletes the soil organic carbon pool 
(Lal 2004).  
The change in land cover through forest and rangeland depletion and adapting them to 
agricultural fields makes soils more vulnerable to erosion (FAO 2003).  Soil erosion leads to 
decline of the soil organic carbon content (Sivakumar 2006).  The depletion of a soil’s organic 
carbon causes a decline in soil quality, decreases biomass, and contributes to global warming 
through emitting carbon to the atmosphere (Lal 2004).  All these consequences of land cover 
changes will lead to desertification in the long term if appropriate management techniques are not 
implemented.     
Pielke (2007) described the impacts of land cover change specifically converting grass 
and forest land to agricultural fields and pastures on regional precipitation.  Pielke (2007) 
conducted case studies in different parts of the world including North and South America, South 
East Asia, China and Africa.  In most of the cases, the land cover changes caused a change in 





increase in rainfall as in South East Asia in wet seasons while it declined in dry seasons (Pielke 
2007).   
 In Iraq, especially the northern part of it, deforestation and rangeland degradation have 
caused massive soil erosion and loss of soil quality especially in hilly and mountainous regions as 
a result of the lost vegetation cover (Hussien Kariem, Abdulmahdi Jbr 2008).  Similarly, 
deforestation and change in the Kurdistan Region’s land cover over the previous decades have 
significant impacts on the regional rainfall pattern, which lead to accelerated losses of soil 
productivity, erosion and land degradation (see chapter two – page 29). 
Desertification and Conditions Unique to Iraq 
The above described causal factors are very general and occur in most of the dry lands in 
the world.  In this section, specific details will be described about causal factors of desertification 
specific to Iraq, such as deliberate depletion of lands or resources by Saddam’s regime, wars, and 
UN economic sanction against Iraq.  
Figure 21: Shows the shrinkage of the Mesopotamian Marshland from 1973 (left image) to 2000 (right 





Abbas Alsakb, an Iraqi water resource expert, mentioned that the wars in Iraq from 1980s 
until the Second Gulf War in 2003 had significant impacts, including increasing desertification.  
Alsakb said that these wars should be examined according to the following criteria: (1) impacts of 
military actions on the land surface and its consequences, (2) lack of government strategies to 
manage resources because the priority was for wars, and (3) inappropriate use of water resources.  
All of these issues caused losses in productivity and quality of Iraq’s fertile soil (Aljazeera.net 
2009).  
In addition to wars and conflicts, UN sanctions against Iraq in 1991 significantly 
contributed to speeding land degradation in Iraq (Aljazeera.net 2009).  As a result of UN 
economic sanctions, the Iraqi government moved toward expanding agricultural lands through 
implementing intensive irrigation systems.  The intensification of irrigation caused changes to the 
hydrology of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers.  Following the 1990s, the Iraqi government 
implemented a massive drainage network in order to increase agricultural lands in Southern Iraq.  
As a result, the ecosystem was changed, soil fertility declined because of sedimentation and 
salinity, and a huge shrinkage of vegetation cover occurred in the Mesopotamian marshlands (see 
figure 21 above) and palm tree forests (Middleton 2005).     
   These changes are one of the most important causes of land degradation and 
desertification all over Iraq.  Even the Kurdistan Region, which is located in the north of Iraq, is 
not protected from the negative consequences of changing the marshland ecosystem.  These 
marshlands provided a greenbelt that protected the Southern Mesopotamian plains and the 
Kurdistan Region from desert expansion.  As shown in figure 21, theses marshlands are almost 
gone.  Figure 22 and 23 show the severity of dust storms that are attacking most of Iraq’s lands.  
The decrease in the amount of water that discharges into the marshlands is considered the main 
challenge today.  There is no solution in sight for the near future, as the situation is expected to 





implement appropriate policies currently as a result of political and security conditions all over 
the nation (Aljazeera.net 2009) (Middleton 2005). 
 
 
Figure 22: Shows the 2009 dust storms the attacked Iraq (EDRO 2009). 






Nowadays, the economic growth in the Kurdistan Region along with overall population 
growth in Iraq motivated the region to develop agriculture sector through 2010 – 2014 plan. This 
in turn increases pressure on lands and leads to utilizing marginal lands, which is ecologically 
unsustainable for growing crops.   The increased demand of agricultural products as population 
increases and economic growth lead to developing monoculture system, which results in further 
decline in arable lands.  Also, population growth and efforts to improve economic condition in 
upstream nations, specifically Turkey damages Iraq through reducing the amount of water that 
Iraq receives, for instance GAP project in Turkey.  In this case, the efforts to solve environmental 
problems as a result of past wars and its consequences on Iraqi environment will be extremely 
hard or even will further worsen the situation.  Climate changes and its consequences, for 
instance frequent droughts and dust storms, worsen the environmental and land condition in Iraq 













The Social, Economic, and Political impacts of Desertification on the Tigris-Euphrates 
Basin Nations 
This chapter provides details about the economic, social and political consequences of 
desertification in Iraq.  The role of environmental instability as a result of desertification and 
other environmental threats in Iraq to promote and cause violence in the other riparian nations is 
explained.  For instance, details provided about how natural resource problem may transform to 
military threats.  The impacts of desertification on Iraq regarding key elements of national 
security; food, health and livelihood security are identified.   Iraq is extremely vulnerable to 
desertification and therefore the key elements of national security in Iraq are threatened by 
environmental instability in its central and southern part as a result of decline of the Tigris and 
Euphrates water.  
 The desertification problem in Iraq and its consequences leads to force people to leave 
their homes (environmental refugee).  That 4500 out of 5000 villages in the Kurdistan Region 
were destroyed by Hussein’s administration and 92% of Iraqi lands are subject to desertification 
is an indication of the environmental refugees’ problem in Iraq.  The current environmental 
instability threats will further complicate the situation.  Quantifying environmental refugees in 
Iraq is impossible because it is hard to distinguish between those who were displaced because of 
poor security conditions in Iraq or because of environmental degradation.  However, the 
continuing decline of the Tigris and Euphrates River water in Iraq will cause further deterioration 
of environmental conditions and might cause environmental instability, creating further regional 







Achieving food security in arid and semi-arid regions typical of the Middle East is a very 
hard goal.  The arid and semi-arid regions are extremely vulnerable to climate change and 
desertification (Brauch 2006).  The drought years, in the last 10 – 15 years in Iraq severely 
undermined Iraqi grain (wheat and barley) production.  The United Nations described the 
1999/2001 drought in Iraq as the worst in the last 50 years.  The levels of the Tigris and 
Euphrates Rivers were very low, about 20% below of their average flow (WHO 2010) or 
according to Congressional Research Services the irrigation water in Iraq was down to 43% 
below normal levels (Congressional Research Service 2004).  The decrease in rainfall caused a 
decline of about 75% in Iraqi grain (wheat and barley) production.  Al – Mosul plateau
10
, which 
produced 70% of Iraqi grain (wheat and barley) and is considered the breadbasket of Iraq, only 
received one-fifth of its average rainfall.  The UNDP (2009) concludes, ―According to Iraqi 
experts, recurring events -- drought and dust storms -- mark the beginning of the end of the Fertile 
Crescent, the breadbasket of the Middle East.‖ 
     Without any doubt, limited resource farmers and herders and other vulnerable 
communities are the most affected by these severe environmental events (FAO 2004).  Therefore, 
food, health, and livelihood security in Iraq is extremely vulnerable to environmental events such 
as drought, soil and water erosion, and desertification.  
Since 1991, as a result of the UN economic sanctions
11
 against Iraq, food security in Iraq 
was disrupted.  As a result of disruption of food security, both health security and livelihood 
security were disrupted through lack of food and nutrition in addition to other issues related to 
                                                             
10 It represents almost the entire Northern plateau.   
 
11 ―The UN Security Council imposed comprehensive economic sanctions against Iraq on August 6, 1990, 
just after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. When the coalition war had ousted Iraq from Kuwait the following 
year, the Council did not lift the sanctions, keeping them in place as leverage to press for Iraqi disarmament 





poverty.  Therefore, the Iraqi government set up a nationwide rationing system in order to prevent 
famine.  In 1996, the Oil for Food program launched by UN Security Council Resolution 986 
(SCR 986) allowed Iraq to sell oil to buy food, medicine, and other necessary non-military 
materials.  But, the FAO (2008) reported that even with SCR 986 contributions to increase food 
rations, food, health, and livelihood security still was under threat because:   
 the monthly food rations were not enough for the whole month 
 the rate of child malnutrition did not improve significantly especially in the central and 
south of Iraq 
 the food that existed in the monthly food rations did not provide a nutritionally sufficient 
and varied diet   
 only small portions of the population were able to supplement their diet through buying 
food from the market at considerable prices.    
It is worth mentioning that there is a significant linkage between the UN economic 
sanctions against Iraq and the deterioration of the Mesopotamian marshlands.  In response to the 
UN economic sanctions, the Iraqi government started expanding agriculture lands all over the 
country to minimize the influence of economic sanctions and reach food self- sufficiency.  The 
cultivated agricultural lands in Iraq as measured in the 1980s were about 2,185,000 hectares; Iraq 
was self-sufficient in 1980 in producing wheat, rice, fruits, vegetables, and sheep and poultry 
products (Williams 2009).  The cultivated agricultural lands reached 3,320,000 hectares in the 
1990s before economic sanctions, and then in 1992 reached 4,900,000 hectares.  In 1992, about 
2,575,000 hectares were supported by irrigation projects, the irrigated areas increased to 
2,700,000 hectares in 1995 and 3,150,000 hectares in 2000 (Asmahel 2004). 
These continuous expansions in agricultural lands, especially irrigated lands, have had a 





quality of water that are discharged in them.  The deterioration that occurred in the Mesopotamian 
marshlands is shown in figure 21 (page 58).  This ecological destruction of Mesopotamian 
marshlands caused a mass displacement, internal and external, of the indigenous people who 
lived there for thousands of years and destroyed the biodiversity of that special ecological system 
(Middleton 2005).  Between 80,000 and 120,000 people from Central Qurnah Marsh have crossed 
the Iraqi border to Iran and another 200,000 have been resettled in other parts of Iraq (Brauch 
2006).  Generally, in the 1950s the overall population of Iraqi marshlands was 400,000 people but 
in 2005 only about 60,000 people were living there (Middleton 2005).     
The environmental refugees influence the environment in the refugee camps, which 
creates significant challenges for the host countries/regions and the agencies that support the 
refugees.  The refugees are increasing the pressure on natural resources in the areas where they 
are resettled through harvesting wood for heating and cooking purposes and other activities that 
deplete vegetation cover.  The relationship between the refugees and the host population is 
critical because both are depending on the available natural resources in the area.  Therefore, 
unsustainable use of resources will threaten the livelihood of the people, in addition to concerns 
regarding loss of biodiversity, soil erosion and loss of land productivity (Keane 2004).             
Economic and Social impacts of Desertification on Iraq 
The economic impacts of desertification on Iraq are the same as defined by the United 
Nations to survey the state of the environment in the world for the period 1972-1992: (1) 
desertification undermines national food production, which contributes to the regional and 
international food crisis, (2) desertification results in a mass food shortage in the damaged 
regions, which negatively influences world food availability and global food trade and markets, 
and (3) desertification is one of the major factors that causes biodiversity decline in arid and 





Desertification is resulting in social instability in communities through promoting 
emigration from rural areas toward cities as environmental refugees looking for jobs and better 
lives.  The social impact of this emigration is devastating on the community because: (1) it 
increases the pressure on the cities through abnormal growth and increase of population, (2) the 
abnormal growth of a city’s population damages the city’s ability to provide healthy services, (3) 
it creates a lot of social issues such as lowering living quality, increasing unemployment, 
decreasing health services and education quality, exacerbating housing problems, creating 
security issues and social conflicts, (4) most of the time refugees are living in unhealthy and poor 
neighborhoods around cities, which are extremely vulnerable to diseases and natural disasters, 
and (5) declining rural population increases desertification issues.  Generally desertification is 
one of the main barriers that confronts social and economic development, which increases the 
economic crises and this will contribute to further environmental degradation in a positive 
feedback loop (Nhma 2009).  
It is very hard to provide specific statistics about environmental emigration in Iraq.  It is 
impossible to distinguish between those who were forced to leave their lands/home as a result of 
the poor security situation and political instability in the country and those who relocated as a 
result of environmental degradation.  According to Congressional Research Service (CRS), about 
2,700,000 people are internally relocated in Iraq in addition to 2,000,000 people who externally 
relocated pre and post 2003 as a result of the poor security situation (Congressional Research 
Service 2009).  But knowing: (1) 92% of Iraq’s arable lands are subject to desertification, (2) Iraq 
has lost almost 2/3 of its date palm trees since the Iraq- Iran war (K. Haktanir 2002), and (3) 
destruction of 4500 out of 5000 villages in the Kurdistan Region by Saddam Hussein’s regime 
(Middle East Watch 1993) are good indicators of the jobs that have been lost and stimulated 





Desertification and environmental degradation is a regional problem in the Tigris and 
Euphrates River Basin nations and in Middle East.  Therefore, significant cause and effect 
linkages exist between all of the regional countries in regards to the desertification issue.  
Studying desertification in all of the Middle Eastern Countries is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
But it is worth mentioning that the issue of desertification affects both Turkey and Syria because 
of their impacts on Iraq regarding the use of the Tigris and Euphrates water resources.  
The drastic increase in desertification rates in the Tigris and Euphrates River basins 
countries are expected according to scenarios of climate change.  Both Turkey and Syria are 
facing land degradation, water scarcity, and limited agricultural production as a result of climatic 
variation, misuse of irrigation systems, land cover changes, agricultural expansion, and soil 
salinization.  The area of surface land in Turkey is 77 million hectares, of which 20 million 
hectares are located in arid and 31 million hectares are located in semi- arid regions.  Generally, 
in Turkey, about 73% of cultivated land and 68% of prime agricultural land are prone to erosion; 
the central south and central north, Mediterranean, and GAP regions are experiencing salinity 
problems.  In Syria, the rangeland is severely damaged by desertification.  The Badia rangeland 
and the marginal zone between the Badia rangeland and the Agricultural Zones, both fragile 
ecosystems, are experiencing a misuse of the resources in addition to frequent dry years.  The 
estimated cost of soil degradation in Syria is equivalent to 12% of the country’s agriculture 
output.  Also, 40% of the irrigated area is damaged by salinity at different levels.  Generally, the 
causes of land degradation in the Tigris and Euphrates Basin Nations are soil erosion, 
alkalinization/salinization, urbanization and soil sealing
12
 (K. Haktanir 2002).  These problems in 
Turkey and Syria make them to implement more projects to meet with their agricultural and 
economic needs on the Tigris and Euphrates Basins and therefore damages Iraq through declining 
                                                             
12 Soil sealing: ―is the covering of the soil surface with an impervious material, or the changing of its nature 
so that the soil becomes impermeable, so that the soil is no longer able to perform the range of functions 





the amount of water resources that Iraq receives.  The situation is further complicated according 
to the climate change scenarios (Table 5 – page 28).     
Conflicts Regarding Control Resources 
The likelihood of conflict regarding control of water resources is high among the Tigris 
and Euphrates River Basin countries.  In the past, such type of conflicts existed.  In 1978, Syria 
supported the Kurds who were living in Turkey to establish an armed party, Kurdistan Labor 
Party (PKK), in order to force Turkey to provide Syria a fair share of water from the Euphrates 
River (Asmahel 2004).  At that time, water scarcity was not as bad as it is currently or as it is 
estimated to be in the future.  In addition to the possible conflicts among countries that are 
sharing these two rivers, the likelihood of internal conflicts exists because of the diversity of the 
ethnic groups that live in the riparian countries and tensions due to internal displacement.                                                                                                   
―Kurdish communities are still coping with the aftermath of the displacement of hundreds of 
thousands of people who fled or were expelled from their villages during the conflict. The 
construction of the Birecik and Atatürk dams on the Euphrates displaced thousands more. 
Because residents of the threatened areas often lack legal land rights, they may be unable to 
secure compensation for lost homes, land and fishing resources.  Local opposition to Ilisu dam 
stems in part from a fear that the Turkish state wants to use infrastructure projects in order to 
appropriate land, alter local geography, and thereby strengthen its security control over the 
region (Angell 2009).”  
The internal conflicts and displacement as a result of natural resource limitations in Iraq 
started in the 1930s.  Because of the availability of fertile lands and water resources in the 
Northern part of Iraq and the Kurdistan Region, compared with the central and southern parts of 
the country, the Iraqi government, through implementing irrigation projects in the Northern part 





the Southern and Central Arabian tribes in the North of Iraq and Kurdistan Region.  The 
indigenous people of the North of Iraq and the 
Kurdistan Region are characterized by religious and 
ethnic diversity as Kurd, Arab, Turkmen, Armenian, 
Assyrian, Christian, Muslim, Azedian, and more, 
considered this government initiative as an 
Arabization process through supporting resettled 
people, ignoring the indigenous people and forcing 
indigenous inhabitants to leave their lands.  This 
process began in 1963 as a result of intense 
government pressures to change the demographic and 
political make-up in the region through forcing 
indigenous inhabitants, mostly Kurds, to leave and 
resettle Arabian tribes in their lands (Asmahel 2004).  The displacement processes were 
implemented by Hussein’s regime like following: the Kurds who were living outside the 
autonomous region of Kurdistan, labeled as Kurdistan areas under the control of Iraqi government 
in figure 24, were simply told by Hussein’s regime that they had to leave their lands in a certain 
period of time.  Otherwise the Iraqi government forced them to leave and be resettled in the 
autonomous region of Kurdistan that protected by alliance forces.  Figure 24 provides insights 
about where the mass displacement occurred.     
 In 2003 after the US invasion, the United Nations reported: 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan's Representative on Internally Displaced Persons, Francis 
M. Deng, said the UN should be asked to help in resolving the issue of internal refugees, 
including 600,000 to 700,000 Kurds in northern Iraq, more than 100,000 Kurds, 
Turkmen and Assyrians in the Kirkuk area, tens of thousands of Arab Shiites in the centre 
Figure 24: Shows the autonomous region of 
Kurdistan and the other parts of Kurdistan 
areas under control of Iraqi government.  





and south, and 100,000 to 200,000 Marsh Arabs in the south.  At the same time, any 
solution had to assure fairness for more than 200,000 Arabs brought into the north by 
Mr. Hussein's regime to replace the Kurds, Mr. Deng said in a statement in Geneva (UN 
2003). 
  The internal resettlement problem has a significant impact on Iraqi political system even 
now.  Currently a significant dispute exists between the Kurdistan Regional Government and the 
Iraqi government regarding any solution for the hundreds of thousands of Kurds and other ethnic 
groups who were forced to leave their lands and hundreds of thousands of Arabs who were 
brought to the North to replace Kurds.  Globally the conflicts in Iraq known mostly as a pure 
ethnic conflict between Kurds and Arabs, but the core of the dispute centers on controlling 
resources, while ethnicity becomes politicized with regard to control over those resources.  Water 
and land scarcity exists all over Iraq, but North Iraq generally and the Kurdistan Region 
especially comprise the richest region in Iraq, based on surface and ground water, as well as 
precipitation and fertile lands (Asmahel 2004).  
Environmental Instability Threats 
According to the UNCCD, desertification is causing : (1) reduction in land resilience to 
climate variability, (2) loss of soil productivity, (3) shrinking vegetative cover, (4) indirect 
impacts, such as health issues, on peoples who are living outside the direct impacted areas, (5) 
undermining of food production, (6) increased famine, (7) increasing conflicts and people 
displacement, and (8) a huge drain of economic resources as a result of influx of ―environmental 
refugees‖ and decreasing national food production in addition to direct impacts on the damaged 
regions (UNCCD Secretariat A 2008).  Therefore, desertification contributes to poverty through 





There are significant interactions between desertification and other important global 
systems such as water resources, food security, biodiversity, energy sources, climate change, and 
socio – economic factors.  Desertification exacerbates poverty and political instability;    
“It contributes significantly to water scarcity, famine, the internal displacement of people, 
migration, and social breakdown. This is a recipe for political instability, for tensions between 
neighboring countries, and even for armed conflict. Evidence is mounting that there is often a 
strong correlation between civil strife and conflict on the one hand and environmental factors 
such as desertification on the other (UNCCD Secretariat C 2008). 
The consequences of desertification and soil erosion undermine the key elements of 
human and social security that are identified by international organizations such as food security, 
health security, livelihood security, and energy security.  Also desertification is considered one of 
several factors that influence, impact, and trigger violent societal outcomes, in addition to famine 
and drought that exacerbate political instability (Brauch 2006).  For example, North Iraq and 
Kurdistan are suffering from sharp declines of groundwater and its socio-economic consequences.  
Dale Lightfoot, an Oklahoma State University Geography Professor, stated that the Karezes
13
 in 
northeastern Iraq, some of them 1500 years old, are dry now as a result of lack of maintenance, 
overuse, and frequent drought.  The livelihood of tens of thousands of villagers who depend on 
these water resources are under threat as a result of drought.  Therefore, the relative stability of 
the Kurdistan region since the 2003 US invasion may suffer harm as a result of a migration 
underway from these villages (Lightfoot 2009).   
Security is the goal of each individual, community, society and nation.  The 21
st
 century 
security challenges may require a new international cooperation based on narrow military 
                                                             
13 ―Karezes, also known as qanats, work using deep wells dug in porous soils near shallow aquifers, 
allowing groundwater to seep into them.  Then, tunnels are dug, by hand and often through bedrock, at a 
gentle slope connecting the central wells to lower ones dug at strategic points in the area.  Maintenance 







 in addition to environmental instability issues.  Since desertification undermines the 
key elements of human security such as food, health, energy, livelihood and health security, 
desertification and other environmental threats are considered among the major factors that threat 
the survival of humankind.  Since the 1990s, the security concept has been broadened by 
scientists and policy makers to include not only a narrow political and military dimension but also 
economic and environmental dimensions (Brauch 2006).   
The situation in the Tigris and Euphrates River basin strongly requires taking into 
consideration economic and environmental dimensions, in addition to narrow military concepts, 
to achieve regional security.  To date, the narrow military concept failed to provide human, 
health, environment, livelihood, and food security in the nations sharing this basin.  But this 
region of the world is woefully violent as a result of wars
15
 and terrorism problems.   Therefore 
security will remain defined in terms of military and physical defense.  However, reducing the 
environmental instability challenges in the region in the long term is as important as military and 
physical defense to achieve national security.  For example, since the 1980s, Turkey has been 
involved in a costly conflict with the Kurdistan Labor Party (PKK) and up to now the situation is 
more critical and complicated than when the conflict started.  It is worth mentioning that PKK 
was created by Syria in 1978 to put pressure on Turkey to provide Syria a fair share of the 
Euphrates River water.  So the PKK case is a good example about how the resource problems can 
transform to military threats.  The reason for the failure of the narrow military concepts to 
achieve national security is simply the problem is a matter of social issues, religion and ethnic 
diversity, human rights, natural resource issues, economic situation, political issues, and the right 
of self determination as a result of existing national boundaries.  Acceleration of the 
desertification process makes the situation even more critical and vulnerable in the basin nations.  
                                                             
14 Having more and more power to protect ourselves from outside threats. 
 






The following is a possible scenario for military threats as a result of resource problems in the 
Tigris and Euphrates River basins:   
The decline of the Tigris and Euphrates water resources in Iraq will motivate people from 
damaged areas in central and south of Iraq to move toward north of Iraq to use available water 
resources because the Tigris and specifically Euphrates River are the only sources of water in 
central and south of Iraq.  North of Iraq specifically the Kurdistan Region is the richest region of 
Iraq as measured by its ground and surface water compared with the other parts of Iraq.  But the 
problem is that Iraq currently faces tensions among its ethnic groups.  For example, there is a 
huge disagreement between the Iraqi Government and the Kurdistan Region Government (KRG) 
regarding controlling lands and oil resources as a result of internal displacement that occurred 
during Hussein’s administration as identified above by Secretary-General Kofi Annan's 
Representative on Internally Displaced Persons, Francis M. Deng.    
The majority of rich water areas are located in the Kurdistan Region and therefore it 
might cause more tensions, perhaps the water issue will be used for political pressure by the KRG 
to force Baghdad to solve disputes in favor of the Kurdistan Region.  It is worth mentioning that 
Iraq has a newly established army since 2003 and the Kurdistan Regional Government has an 
army of 200,000 soldiers.  Therefore, any mistakes will cause devastating conflicts between both 
sides.  To date the issue of Hussein’s internal displacement of Kurds and bringing about 200,000 
Arabs to displace Kurds has not been solved.  Therefore, any other movement from the south 
toward the north, for whatever reasons, will not be accepted by the Kurdistan Regional 
Government, therefore the probability of confrontation will be extremely high.  It is worth 
mentioning that a few times both sides were at the edge of war but United States Army mediation 





On the other side of the issue, about 20 million Kurds are living in southeastern Turkey in 
addition to several million in Iran and Syria.  Therefore, the Turkish government watches the 
KRG carefully, afraid of its Kurds for asking for the same right.  Since 2003, Turkey located its 
army around Iraqi borders in case of initiation from the KRG to declare an independent Kurdistan 
or trying to gain more power through controlling disputed territories
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 .  Kurdish leaders from 
time to time are indirectly warning Turkey that they are able to move Kurds in Turkey against the 
Turkish government in case of any attacks from Turkey against the Kurdistan Region.  Therefore, 
any problems in Iraq will move easily to its neighbors.  In case of political instability in Iraq and 
Turkey, the other players in the region such as Syria, Saudi Arabia and Iran will automatically be 
involved because of the Sunni and Shiite issue.   Both Syria and Saudi Arabia support Sunni 
groups while Iran supports Shiite groups, while the Kurdish population in Iran, Syria and Turkey 
support Kurds in Iraq.    
In the case when the decline of the Tigris and specifically Euphrates water reaches a 
point in Iraq that is not able to sustain the population in central and south of Iraq, there are no 
options for people except moving toward where resources are available in north of Iraq or other 
countries.  With the tensions that exist in the north, the likelihood of military confrontation is 
extremely high.  If such conflict happens, it will look like a fire that starts from a very small spot 
in the forest but very soon burns the entire forest.     
Therefore, achieving long term national or regional security must take into consideration 
environmental instability in the Tigris and Euphrates River basins.  The consequences of 
desertification in Iraq as identified above will not remain within the Iraqi borders.  Perhaps the 
short term scenario is the environmental emigration problem in Iraq, but the medium and long 
                                                             
16 Disputed Territories are the areas that the Kurdistan Region claims it should be under the KRG control 
officially because it was dominated by Kurds and Hussein’s regime changed the demographic fact by 
bringing hundreds of thousands of Arabs to replace Kurds in these regions.  But the Iraqi government 
rejects the KRG demands in this regard.  The areas that are labeled in figure 24 as Kurdistan areas under 





term will be devastating conflicts regarding the control of resources if the appropriate broadening 
security concept based on physical defense and environmental instability issues are not 
implemented to manage available resources in the Tigris and Euphrates Basins among the 
riparian nations and to achieve regional security.  Such conflicts will not only threaten the 
regional and national security of the basin nations, but also will damage the entire world and 
international security.  For example, any conflict will disrupt the oil production processes and 
supply lines, which will severely damage the global economy, leading to global crises.  The 
question with current environmental threats to Iraq and the basin in general is ignoring 
possibilities of any environmental instability as a result of inflexible strategies regarding 
ownership and using of the Tigris and Euphrates River water resources specifically by Turkey 
secure any single country?    
Conclusion 
The Iraqi food, livelihood and health security is extremely vulnerable to climate changes 
and desertification.  Iraq already struggles form internal displacement by Hussein’s regime and 
deliberate destruction of villages in the Kurdistan Regions and Mesopotamian marshes, in 
addition to other displacement regarding changing demographics in the north of Iraq.  Therefore, 
the desertification problem further complicates these problems through stimulating environmental 
refugees.  Generally, Iraq is the most vulnerable country in the Tigris and Euphrates Basins 
regarding consequences of climate change problems and its consequences as a result of its 
downstream location. 
The likelihood of internal and external conflicts regarding fresh water in Iraq specifically 
and the region generally as consequences of Iraqi problems is extremely possible unless 
appropriate strategies are followed to implement fair management of both rivers.  For instance, 





from the rural area as a result of drying karezes.  However, any environmental instability in Iraq 
will lead to threats to all of the Tigris and Euphrates basins’ nations.  Therefore, combating 
regional environmental instability is as important as military and physical defense in term of 



















Managing the Tigris and Euphrates River Water Resources 
This chapter provides details about the historical development of engineering projects on 
the Tigris and Euphrates River.  Details about the history of negotiations among riparian nations 
regarding managing these two rivers are addressed.  The major points of disputes among the 
riparian nations are addressed.  Also, details about tensions regarding water resources problem 
that occurred between these nations is provided.  This chapter is an important part of this thesis 
because it identified the points of disputes and type of threats as a result of the fresh water 
problem among the riparian nations.  Knowing the nature of problems among the riparian nations 
is significant regarding providing recommendation to provide a model to manage water resources 
in the Tigris and Euphrates River.  In the final part of this chapter, the recommendation is 
provided to find a model to manage the Tigris and Euphrates River.      
Historically, Iraq was the first country to develop engineered projects in the Tigris and 
Euphrates Basin.  Iraq started engineering projects in this basin in the first half of the twentieth 
century, the Hindiya barrage was built in 1913 and Al Ramadi barrage was built in 1950.  The 
main purposes of these two dams were irrigation and flood control.  While Syria and Turkey 
began developing dams in this basin in the second half of the twentieth century.  Syria started 
building Al Tabqa
17
 dam on the Euphrates in 1966, completing work in 1973.  Turkey began 
constructing dams in this basin in 1966; the Keban, Karakaya, and Ataturk dams were built, as a 
part of GAP project, in this basin in 1966, 1986, and 1992 respectively.  The GAP is an 
interministerial or multi-purpose project in southeastern Turkey to develop the Tigris and 
                                                             





Euphrates River basins through building 22 dams on these two rivers.  Details were provided 
about the GAP project in chapter one (Kaya 1998).   
These projects were developed in each country without taking into consideration the 
environmental impacts of these projects (mostly dams) on the other riparian nations, the other 
riparian nations’ needs, and the basin’s capacity.  Therefore, the distribution of fresh water in this 
basin, to date, continues to cause tensions among riparian nations.  In the past, a few tensions 
occurred among the three principals.  For example, near the completion of Keban dam, Syria 
launched a campaign against Turkey, but the situation got better when Turkey assured Syria that 
the dam will not cause significant harm.  Also, during the time of filling Al Tabqa dam tensions 
rose between Syria and Iraq.  Iraq threatened to bomb the dam; both countries were at the edge of 
conflict in 1975 and both of them moved troops to their common border.  The threat of war died 
after Saudi Arabia and the Soviet Union mediated, and Syria agreed to release more water to Iraq.  
Iraqi authorities privately stated that Syria agreed to take 40% of the Euphrates water and release 
the rest of it to Iraq, but this agreement was never made public (Kaya 1998).  
The first event among the three nations in this basin rose in 1970s, while the second 
major tension occurred in the 1990s during the time of filling Ataturk dam.  Syria and Iraq 
complained that Turkey did not inform them about the cut off time, meaning when Turkey would 
be filling the dam and thus stopping the flow from the Euphrates southward.  Turkey stated that it 
had informed both Syria and Iraq about interruption of the Euphrates water flow for one month 
according to technical necessities.  Turkey even stated that it increased water flow above the 
1987s protocol (500 m
3
/sec) in order to help downstream nations store surplus amounts of water 
and use it during release interruptions as a result of filling the Euphrates dams in Turkey.  At that 
time, Iraq threatened to bomb Turkey’s dams as a result of interruption of the water flow.  Also, 
both Iraq and Syria tried going through the Arab League to take actions against Turkey and 





Negotiation and information exchange efforts began among these nations in the early 
1960s.  From the beginning of negotiations among Turkey, Syria and Iraq in 1964 until 
suspension of negotiations in the 1990s, each country adhered to its inflexible strategies 
concerning shared water resources.  Since the early 1960s Iraq showed a strong interest in 
immediate sharing agreements for managing water resources, joined by Syria in the 1980s.  
Turkey as a new user stated that its priority is for domestic (Turkey’s) projects and showed 
interest in making a joint study to identify irrigation needs for each country and make an 
allocation agreement based on that study (KİBAROĞLU 2003). 
In the negotiations held in 1964 between Iraq and Turkey, Turkey proposed to establish a 
joint technical committee (JTC) to inspect each river to determine the average yearly discharge, 
to evaluate the water needs of irrigable lands of each nation through joint field studies, and to 
estimate the current and future needs of water in each country in order to set up a plan sharing the 
Tigris and Euphrates Rivers.  Following the 1964 meeting, a few more secondary meetings were 
organized in the region.  In 1965 the first tri-partite meeting among Syria, Turkey and Iraq was 
held in Baghdad.  The major discussion point in that meeting was exchanging technical 
information regarding the dams in each country (KİBAROĞLU 2003). 
The deep disputes regarding an agreement to share the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers 
appeared in the 1965 meeting.  Iraq’s delegation submitted a proposal to establish a permanent 
JTC to be responsible for implementation and supervision of any agreements among the nations.  
But Turkey’s delegation strongly rejected Iraq’s proposed draft and stated that the JTC could only 
be responsible for sustaining coordination of the current and future projects in the river basin.  On 
the other hand, Syria proposed including the possibility of diverting a fraction of the Tigris water 
in order to cover the shortages of the Euphrates River among the responsibilities of JTC.  But this 
proposal was strongly rejected by the Iraqi delegation and insisted on holding discussions on each 





were held among the three countries but they did not result in an agreement (KİBAROĞLU 
2003). 
In the 1980s Iraq took the initiative to establish a new JTC as a result of intense use of the 
Tigris and Euphrates Rivers in Turkey.  A new JTC was established at the end of the joint 
economic commission between Iraq and Turkey in 1980.  Syria joined the new JTC in 1983.  The 
purpose of establishing a new JTC, as paraphrased from Kibaroglu (2003), were to: (1) discuss 
and finalize the water issues in the Tigris and Euphrates basin, (2) find mechanisms to determine 
appropriate and reasonable amounts of water that each nation would need form both rivers, (3) 
share meteorological and hydrological data in each country, (4) share information about dam and 
irrigation projects in each country, and (5) exchange information about filling reservoirs in 
Turkey (KİBAROĞLU 2003).   
After sixteen meetings from the 1980s until 1993, the nations were not able to 
accomplish new JTC goals or even agree on an outline of its meetings.  The main dispute points 
paraphrased from Kibaroglu (2003) were: (1) subject and objectives of the negotiations, (2) 
whether the Tigris and Euphrates should be considered a single system or the discussion should 
be only about Euphrates, and (3) using terminology for the final JTC objectives: whether using 
―sharing of international rivers‖ or ―utilization of transboundary water courses.‖  Both Iraq and 
Syria consider the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers to be International Watercourses.  Both of them 
insist on immediate river sharing agreements depending on the declared water needs for each 
country.  Meanwhile, Turkey considers the Tigris and Euphrates River a single transboundary 
river basin and any agreements should be based on objective needs (KİBAROĞLU 2003).   
JTC meetings did not reveals any insights for solutions in this basin.  The UN 
Watercourse Convention on the law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International 





order to succeed, future efforts to solve water issues in this basin should expand JTC functions to 
broader scales including economic and security cooperation among them to attract all riparian 
nations to negotiations table (KİBAROĞLU 2003).  Also, providing Turkey with details about 
probabilities of environmental instability in Iraq and how it might negatively damage Turkey’s 
national security should be a point to consider to convince Turkey to agree on a fair management 
of these two rivers.   Of course mediation by other countries such as the United States, Saudi 
Arabia and international organizations such as the United Nations, Arabian League and European 
Union is possible.  But the issue is that each nation considers these two rivers as a part of their 
national security and therefore it is hard to convince each player to sacrifice and create a flexible 
atmosphere for successful negotiations. 
For example, if the Tigris and Euphrates are considered a single basin, Iraq will be the 
major loser because in this case the nations can divert water from the Tigris to the Euphrates.  But 
if the Tigris and the Euphrates are considered two separate basins, Iraq will be the major winner 
because each basin will have its own sharing agreement and Iraq will get a fair share from 
Euphrates without taking into considering diversion of water from the Tigris River to cover water 
shortages in the Euphrates River.  The reason is that Iraq contributes about 34% to the Tigris 
River water and therefore does not have significant problem of water shortage in the Tigris unlike 
the Euphrates, which Iraq does not contribute water (Asmahel 2004).     
Because of the topographic characteristics of the Tigris basin, it is very hard to establish 
big projects in Turkey and Syria on the Tigris River.  The topographic conditions in the Euphrates 
basin, however, are suitable for big irrigation projects in both Syria and Turkey.  Therefore both 
Syria and Turkey are trying to push the point that the Tigris and Euphrates comprise a single 
basin system to get more water from the Euphrates and convince Iraq to fulfill its water demands 
from the Euphrates with water diverted from the Tigris.  Iraq strongly rejects this idea and insists 





International Watercourses while Turkey states that these two rivers are Transboundary Rivers 
(Asmahel 2004).  Obviously, each country has a different point of view to solve the water issue in 
this region.   
The negotiations among/between all the basin nations, including Iran, since the early 
1960s have yet to produce a single significant agreement between them regarding these two 
rivers.  But, there are a few bilateral agreements between some countries, though never applied on 
the ground.  History shows a significant failure of these negotiations and often deepens the 
disputes among the nations.  The delay does not favor downstream countries, specifically Iraq.  
As mentioned previously in this chapter, the water resources in this basin cannot meet the current 
and future demands of water in all the riparian countries.  Therefore, the nations must develop a 
scheme for regional cooperation according to the basin’s characteristics based on economic, 
environmental, and security factors to manage water resources. 
As water becomes scarce and demand increases as a result of population growth, these 
nations should create a new atmosphere for negotiation with new and flexible strategies that 
benefit all of them in order to prevent armed conflicts in the future.  This thesis provides some 
suggestions, taking into consideration the points that each country insisted on in previous 
negotiations, to produce a mechanism for sharing the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers:
18
  
1. Inspect the yearly water discharge in both of the Tigris and Euphrates Basin.  
2. Identify the current and future needs of water for irrigation and other uses in each country. 
3- Identify the population that lives in the Tigris and Euphrates Basin in each nation. 
4. Evaluate the amount of shortage of water in the basin and possibilities of covering any 
shortages. 
5. Establish a joint committee to develop the entire basin to benefit the basin residents in all 
countries. 
                                                             





6. Direct negotiation and cooperation among all nations during the drought seasons and the 
allowable storage water in upstream reservoirs to minimize harm to those downstream.  
7- Set up a regional cooperation system to use water resources as efficiently as possible.  For 
example, each country should inform the others when its demand for water decreases in order to 
facilitate their storage of the surplus amount of water for the peak demand time instead of wasting 
that water. 
8- Establish a neutral committee of experts to develop, assess, and observe water resources in the 
region in order to develop a sustainable management strategy to use water resources. 
9- Establish a political committee to solve the other issues that are not related to the Tigris and 
Euphrates River in order to smooth the atmosphere to resolve the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers’ 
issues.  
Without solving political issues among these nations it will be impossible to make an 
agreement to share the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers or most probably these two rivers will be used 
against downstream nations for political reasons.  Therefore, the three nations should solve their 
political problems in order to develop the Tigris and Euphrates basin as a single ecosystem 
without taking into consideration the political borders because the consequences of large scale 












Strategies to Combat Desertification in Iraq and the Kurdistan Region 
This chapter provides details about methods of using local resources such as rainwater in 
Iraq to combat desertification.  These methods include harvesting rainwater and forestry systems.  
Two case studies in arid and semi arid regions, Sudan and Egypt, are provided regarding 
harvesting rainwater to be used as a model for using such type of techniques in Iraq.  Also, 
forestry systems including managing vegetation cover, agroforestry systems, sand dunes fixation 
and establishing national park and genetic resources to combat desertification are proposed.  
Recommendations are provided for how to establish these systems.  Generally, proposed forestry 
systems and harvesting rainwater techniques are suitable or possible to be implemented mostly in 
north of Iraq because the availability of resources such as effective precipitation, 200 – 1200 mm.  
But in south and central Iraq, these systems are not effective because the lack of enough annual 
rainfall, below 100 mm.     
Rain Water Harvesting (RWH) 
One of the significant methods to combat desertification in Iraq is harvesting rain water.  
Even though precipitation levels vary from north to south, rainwater can be harvested and be used 
in some parts of the country.  Since Iraq is located in an arid and semi-arid region of the Middle 
East, two successful rainwater harvesting cases in arid and semi-arid regions, Sudan and Egypt, 
will be mentioned in order to show the opportunities for harvesting rainwater in Iraq.    
Harvesting rainwater requires techniques for collecting, storing and distributing rainwater 
as efficiently as possible.  The rainwater can be harvested from different places such as roofs, 
ground surface, and intermittent or ephemeral watercourses.  The harvested water can be used for 





and water supply for fish and duck ponds.  Depending on the water sources, different techniques 
have been used to harvest rainwater such as terraces, counter–ridge terracing, dams, micro-
catchments, cisterns, earth dykes, wadi-bank enforcement, and earth canals (Nasr 1999).   
Most of the Middle East and North African (MENA) region, including Iraq, is water 
scarce.  The amount of seasonal rainfall is highly variable and unpredictable.  Harvesting 
rainwater helps local people meet their water demands without needing additional amounts of 
water, which reduces the side effects of inefficient use of water such as desertification.  
Therefore, effective harvesting of rainfall can be used to control desertification.  People in the 
MENA region consider harvesting rainwater as techniques for survival because it will increase 
agricultural and fruit tree productivity, control erosion, conserve soil moisture, and improve grass 
and rangelands conditions (Nasr 1999).  
Sudan  
Gadaref city is located in the semi-arid area of east central Sudan; it is the capital city of 
Gadaref state.  Gadaref state is one of the major states for livestock and crop production in Sudan.  
Annual precipitation varies from 900 mm in the south, to 200 mm in the North; the average 
yearly precipitation in the Gadaref state is 600 mm.  Gadaref city suffered from a shortage of 
drinking water for decades and imported half of its daily water requirements from Al-Showak 
water station 50 km away through pipes and from local salty wells, in addition to borehole wells 
in Abu Al-Naja area 10 km away.  The situation became more complicated as a result of the 
consequences of climate change and a steady growth of population.  Population increased from 
66,467 in 1973 to 354,927 in 2007 (Ibrahim 2009).   
In 1995, the authorities in Gadaref city built a small dam, Al-Saraf, on the Khor Abu 
Fargha stream.  The purpose of building Al-Saraf dam was to protect the city from seasonal 





levels by a few meters in the area through infiltration of water stored behind a dam.  The increase 
in ground water level provided a pure and safe water source for drinking, farming and other 
domestic uses.  The first indication of increasing ground water appeared from a farmer who 
earlier had abandoned his farm because his well went dry, but after building the dam the farmer 
noticed that the well was supplied with water again.  The positive consequences of Al-Saraf dam 
to provide sustainable sources of water to the city encouraged the authorities to build more such 
small dams to harvest rain water (Ibrahim 2009).   
A few more small dams were built for the same purpose.  Generally these dams, through 
increasing the ground water table, supported improved food security, helped to eradicate poverty, 
created recreational areas, increased water availability, improved environmental quality, 
improved fauna and flora conditions, increased incomes and improved socio-economic conditions 
in the Gadaref area.  For example, before these dams existed, the farmers left their farms and 
people brought vegetables from far away to sell at considerable prices in Gadaref.  But now the 
land owners and farmers are able to produce a portion of vegetable needs for Gadaref with 
affordable prices in addition to creating jobs for the laborers.  The success of these small dams in 
Gadaref region encouraged the authorities to take harvesting rainwater into consideration in order 
to solve the current and future problems related to fresh water availability in Gadaref as a result 
of population growth and climate changes (Ibrahim 2009).     
Egypt 
In Egypt more than 161,000 inhabitants, 59% of whom raise livestock, depend on 
harvesting rainwater to raise goats, sheep, crops and fruit trees in wadis and depressions where 
water can be harvested.  Despite some issues related to soil erosion here and there, harvesting 
rainwater in Egypt is considered one of the successful cases of efficient use of rainwater.  For 
example, from 1980s to 1996, 40% of the cultivated area increased in the surveyed areas in 





significantly contributed to restoring vegetation cover and reversing soil erosion in degraded 
areas in northwest coastal Egypt (Nasr 1999).      
The increase of water and soil conservation activities strengthened efforts to combat 
desertification and increased desert reclamation efforts.  As a result of rainwater harvesting 
mechanisms, newly cultivated land increased by 15% among surveyed farms in Egypt with the 
possibility of more increases if appropriate policies were applied.  Generally, rainwater harvesting 
motivated farmers to care more about vegetation cover, soil quality, windbreaks, and fruit trees.  
For example, plantations of fruit trees have increased by 30% among existing farmers.  Also 
harvesting rainwater resulted in increasing crop production, encouraged the farmers to reduce use 
of chemical fertilizers and this in turn supported efforts to develop sustainable land management 
methods (Nasr 1999).   
Harvesting rainwater techniques have significant impact on improving livestock 
production for Bedouin herders and farmers in Egypt.  Livestock for people
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 is not only a source 
of income, but a way of life.  Livestock for farmers or Bedouin herders is like a bank.  They tend 
to increase the quantity of their herds when they have surplus of money and convert animals to 
cash when they need money.  Increasing the size of livestock herds increases the demand for 
grain (barley).  The increased demand for grain encouraged farmers to increase cultivated lands 
through more efficient use of water and soil conservation.  Also, the economic benefits from 
increasing grain production and livestock population increased the effort to establish more 
rainwater harvesting systems and more efficient use of water and land resources (Nasr 1999).  
 
 
                                                             





Harvesting Rainwater in Iraq 
It is worth mentioning that some parts of Iraq (details were provided in chapter one) have 
a higher precipitation rate while other parts have lower rates compared with the Sudanese and 
Egyptian cases.  Generally, the effectiveness of rainwater harvesting systems decreases when 
moving toward southern Iraq as a result of decreasing average annual precipitation below 100 
mm.  The Northern Iraq and Kurdistan regions are suitable for harvesting of rainwater as a result 
of good precipitation, varying from above 1000 mm in top north and northeastern parts of Iraq to 
about the 200 – 400 mm zone in the southern part of north Iraq.  Rainwater harvesting techniques 
can be used especially in Northern Iraq as a method to combat desertification and increase the 
surface and ground water tables in the region, in addition to other environmental and economic 
benefits as addressed in the Sudanese and Egyptian cases.  Also, the harvested rainwater from the 
north can be used to stabilize the water flow of the Tigris River in order to reduce the impact of 
water shortage in southern Iraq.  The following are possible techniques for harvesting rainwater 
in Kurdistan and North Iraq: 
 RWH on farms system:  The purpose of this system is to use rainwater as 
efficiently as possible on croplands.  This system works in a way that captures 
rainwater where it falls.  In short, this system is designed to reduce the total run off 
in cropped areas by keeping rainwater in place and extending the time for 
infiltration.  Basically the idea is conserving soil and water through increasing water 
infiltration into soil.  Examples of such types of systems are deep tillage, dry 
seeding, mixed cropping, ridges and borders, and terraces (B.P. Mbilinyi 2005).   
 Micro Catchment HRW System: The cropped land system is located in a runoff 
catchment area and a cultivated basin.  The runoff is concentrated in a cultivated 
basin where the water is stored and effectively used by plants.  The catchment area 





suitable for medium water demanding crops such as sorghum, groundnuts, and 
millet.  Examples of such type of HRW system are pitting, strip catchment tillage, 
contour bunds, semi-circular bunds and charco dams.  (B.P. Mbilinyi 2005)  The 
following are descriptions about each system:  
 Pitting: These are small semi-
circular pits dug to break the 
crusted soil surface.  Diameter in 
depth of pits is varied according to 
the regional characteristics.  Seeds 
are planted in the middle of the pits; this technique is suitable in the areas 
that have a mean rainfall of 350 – 600 mm  (Mahoo 1995). 
 Strip catchment tillage: Mahoo 
(1995) describes this system as 
involving―…tilling strips of land 
along crop rows and leaving 
appropriate sections of the inter-row 
space uncultivated so as to release runoff. It is normally used where the 
slopes are gentle and the runoff from the uncultivated parts adds water to 
the cropped strips.‖   
 Contour bunds: Mahoo (1995) 
describes this system as, ―the system 
consists of small trash, earth or stone 
embankments, constructed along the 
Figure 25: Layout of pitting system  
(Mahoo 1995). 
Figure 26: Layout of SCT (Mahoo 
1995). 
Figure 27: Layout of contour bunds 





contour lines. The embankments trap the water flow behind the bunds 
allowing deeper infiltration into the soil. The height of the bund determines 
the net storage of the structure.‖ 
 Semi-circular bunds: Mahoo (1995) describes this system as following 
―Runoff water is collected within 
the hoop from the area above it and 
impounded by the depth decided by 
the height of the bund and the 
position of the tips. Excess water is 
discharged around the tips and is intercepted by the second row and so on.‖ 
 Macro Catchment RWH system: This system is characterized by a large 
catchment area.  Usually the cropped land is located outside the border of catchment 
area.  In this system the farmers have little or no control of the catchment area.  This 
system has intermediate elements for collecting, transferring and storing runoff.  
Generally in this system farmers are planting in lower lands in the region and 
getting water from the surrounding high lands, where the catchment is located (B.P. 
Mbilinyi 2005).   
 Terraces: These are a combination of ridges and channels that intercept and hold 
runoff in fields characterized by moderate to steep slopes.  The purpose of terraces 
is to decrease the force of sheet and rill erosion, prevent gully development and 
conserve soil moisture through retaining runoff.  Strong well-maintained terraces 
will lead to less sediment pollution reaching lakes and streams.  Terraces are used in 
areas with topography and soil characteristic that allows terrace construction and 
farming by reasonable efforts, need water conservation, and have excess runoff 
problem.  The effectiveness of terraces depends on the climatic condition, soil 
Figure 28: Layout of semi circular 





erodibility, agriculture activity, maintenance and plans.  There are two types of 
terraces: storage terraces and gradient terraces.  Storage terraces are the type that 
hold water until it can infiltrate the ground or be released through a controlled 
outlet.  Gradient terraces are those that are designed in a way to slow runoff water 
and carry it out in a manageable way to reduce erosion such as a grassed waterway 
(Carman n.d.). 
 Small Dams: Details about this rainwater harvesting method were provided in the 
section on Gedaref Sudan.  It is worth mentioning that the Kurdistan region is 
moving toward developing small dams to harvest rain and snow melt in the region 
instead of large scale dams (rudaw.net 2010).  But small and medium scale dams 
are facing challenges because of disputes among Iraqis to control resources, as 
mentioned in chapter three. 
The scale of this conflict over dam construction has already appeared through 
concerns raised in Baghdad about plans for small and medium scale dams to catch 
rain and surface water in Kurdistan Region because of the negative impacts on the 
rest of Iraq (rudaw.net 2010).  On the other hand, authorities in Kurdistan Region 
claim that only small and medium scale dams will serve this region because of the 
regional land characteristics while large dams, preferred by Baghdad, will only 
damage the region through flooding fertile lands.  (Asmahel 2004)  
Other rainwater harvesting techniques such as counter ridge terracing, cisterns, earth 
canals, earth dykes (spate
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 irrigation and small-head pumps & earth canals) and wadi-bank 
                                                             
20 ―Spate irrigation is a type of water management that makes use of water from ―spates‖, short duration 
floods. Spates – lasting from a few hours to a few days – are diverted from normally dry riverbeds and 
spread gently over agricultural land. After the land is inundated crops are sometimes sown immediately. 
Often the moisture is stored in the soil profile and used later. The spate irrigation systems support low 
economic value farming systems, usually cereals (sorghum, wheat, barley), oilseeds (mustard, castor, 
rapeseed), pulses (chickpea, cluster-bean), but also cotton, cucurbits and even vegetables. Besides 





enforcement are used in arid and semi-arid lands of the Middle East.  These systems are 
possibilities for harvesting rainwater in Iraq.  The objectives of these systems are; soil and water 
conservation, storing harvested water, divert water to limited water resource areas, and divert 
water for irrigation (Nasr 1999).   
It is worth mentioning that in Iraq the government is responsible for such type of projects.  
Therefore, the people or the farmers/land owners are not responsible for the costs of building 
these facilities for rainwater harvesting.  It is the governments’ motivation to improve agricultural 
and environmental conditions in the country.  For example, if a small dam is built in a certain area 
to irrigate few thousand hectares of privately owned farms, the government will own the dam but 
will never charge farmers for costs of building this dam.  In case of flooding privately owned 
lands as a result of building dams, the government is responsible to provide fair compensation to 
the land owners.  The government is also responsible for managing and maintaining the dam and 
sometimes guiding the farmers on how to get best benefits from available resources.  In case of 
building such facilities on public lands, the government decides how to manage these lands, in 
most of the cases if the project is for agricultural purposes, the government distributes the land 
among local farmers but the land is government property provided freely to the local farmers to 
use it for a certain period of time.  This period of time varies according to government policy.  
For example, if the land is close to a city or a town and after 20 years city is expanded, then the 
government has a right to take the land from the farmers without any significant compensation.               
Forestry systems to Combat Desertification 
The United Nations’ FAO identified different types of forestry activities to combat 
desertification and to rehabilitate degraded lands.  The following are the major forestry activities 
to combat desertification and to rehabilitate degraded lands: (1) management of natural 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
and they are used to spread water for pasture or forest land in some places (Frank Steenbergen, Abraham 





vegetation, (2) agroforestry systems, (3) sand dune fixation, and (4) creation of national parks and 
conservation of genetic resources (FAO 1993).  These general forestry activities identified by 
FAO can be implemented to combat desertification and to rehabilitate degraded lands in Iraq.  
 Management of Natural Vegetation: Vegetation cover has a critical role in protecting 
the surface soil from erosion and to control soil salinity.  In addition to soil protection 
benefits, vegetation cover is a good source of wood, fuel wood, forage, and non wood 
forest products.  (FAO 1993)  Iraqi vegetation cover was severely degraded in the past, 
with details provided about Northern forests and Southern marshes in chapters one and 
two.  Therefore, any anti-desertification actions and rehabilitation of degraded lands 
should pay particular attention to protecting the remaining vegetation cover and 
redeveloping these areas. 
Restoring Southern marshes is critical to controlling and reducing the impact of dust 
storms that come from the Arabian Peninsula to Iraq.  The effort to restore Iraqi 
marshlands started in 2003 through re-flooding of the drained marshes.  But the 
challenges that remain are the lack of sufficient and sustained sources of water as a result 
of Iran, Turkey, and Syria’s water management policies, Iraqi use of the Tigris and 
Euphrates’ water for irrigation and the resulting water quality.  Though there is an 
improvement in the Iraqi marshes’ vegetative cover from 2000 to 2005 as it is shown in 
figure 29 (CURTIS J. RICHARDSON , NAJAH A. HUSSAIN 2006).  Generally, 
restoring Iraqi marshes is one of the most significant steps to combat desertification in the 





The destruction of Iraqi date palm trees in the southern and central parts of Iraq has had 
significant impacts on Iraq’s environment.  Part of the solution to the desert expansion issue in 
Iraq involves restoring this vegetative covers (mostly date palms) in southern and central Iraq.  
The recommendation to restore date palm orchards will depend on the causes of their declining 
numbers.  The major cause of declining date palm orchards are fungi, pests, and lack of water, it 
is worth mentioning that Iraq once was producing three quarter of world’s dates and has 629 
varieties of date palm trees.  The challenges that confront the effort to restore date palm orchards 
are the lack of sufficient electricity, machinery and persistent drought, in addition to devastating 
diseases that attacked date palm trees (Williams 2009).   
The following recommendations are provided for restoration of the date palm orchards:  
(1) offer government subsidies to farmers to reestablish their farms, (2) provide sufficient 
electricity to the farms, (3) solve the water issue, as described above, (4) promote varieties of date 
palms resistant to the diseases plaguing the trees, (5) research the remaining species, the rare 
Figure 29:  Shows the progresses of restoring Southern Iraqi Marshes until 2005 (CURTIS J. 





species, and the extinct ones in order to put efforts in the right place, and (6) support farmers to 
maintain their farms. 
In the north of Iraq the destruction of forests and vegetation cover have been severe.  The 
restoration of destroyed forests and vegetation cover is not an easy task for the following reasons: 
(1) a massive government effort to increase grain production, (2) lack of sufficient budget 
availability to support forest and range land development, (3) government subsidies encourage 
monoculture development in the region, (4) supplementary irrigation systems encourage planting 
of marginal rainfall lands, which lead to damage to wild plant species, (5) climatic conditions, 
especially in summer, make seedling survival unlikely without irrigation, (6) costs of maintaining 
afforested and reforested areas is very high as a result of irrigation requirements especially in 
summer, and (7) lack of advanced machinery to maintain forests such as firefighting equipment.       
There are signs of improvement in the forestry conditions in the Kurdistan Region.  
According to the Ministry of Agriculture in Kurdistan region, the areas covered with afforestation 
projects in Kurdistan region are about 38,701 Dunums or 9,674.25 hectares.   Information is not 
available about the reforestation actions themselves.  The infrastructure for producing seedlings is 
available in Kurdistan region.  The available nurseries are able to produce about 4,245,000 
seedlings per year if used in full capacity and properly (Agrawi 2008).   
The following are recommendations to improve forestry and vegetation cover in 
Kurdistan Region and North of Iraq: (1) enact regulations that require each farm to have 10% to 
15% of the farm area covered with trees in order to get government support for agricultural 
product subsides, (2) provide farmers with free seedlings that have economic value so the farmers 
can reap benefits from these trees, (3) establish new forestry infrastructure and restore those used 
in the past, (4) reduce agricultural activities in marginal and non-guaranteed rainfall regions to 





grazing lands instead of supporting monoculture development by providing farmers with 
supplementary irrigation systems, (6) implement rotational grazing systems in marginal, non 
guaranteed and grazing lands instead of implementation of monoculture systems, (7) develop 
nurseries to produce seeds of wild plant species to reintroduce them to the range and grazing land, 
(8) establish projects to protect wildlife and reintroduce them to the ecosystem, and (9) enact 
strict regulations to protect forests and wildlife.   
These facilities and infrastructures are owned and sponsored by government except 
privately owned farms.  In case of establishing nurseries, restoring grazing lands and forest areas, 
the government owns these facilities.  In most of the cases, the reforested areas will be under 
government observation and harvesting trees and hunting wildlife’s are prohibited
21
.  Grazing 
land is open for the local herders but managed by the government to prevent overusing of 
resources.  These facilities are managed by the government but it is open for public benefit.  For 
example, if a farm owner wants to establish a living fence around his farm.  The government 
provides him with free forest tree seedlings for that purpose.  The species are mostly picked by 
government forestry and agricultural experts who determine the maximum environmental 
benefits.           
 Agroforestry Systems: Agroforestry systems are an effective method in arid and semi-
arid areas to tackle the fluctuation of rainfall amounts and the economic consequences of 
this fluctuation through providing various fruits, fiber, energy and fodder crops in 
agricultural lands.  Agroforestry can also improve soil and water conservation efforts and 
aid environmental protection (FAO 1993).  There are two types of agroforestry systems 
that are popular in Western Asian Countries including Iraq: windbreaks, shelterbelts and 
fruit orchards (FAO n.d.).  The multipurpose tree species that are suitable for windbreaks 
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and shelterbelts agroforestry system in Near Eastern Countries including Iraq are the 
following: poplars, walnuts, pines and cypresses (FAO 1993).  Also, the tree species 
identified in appendices one and two can be used depending on regional characteristic 
and purposes of planting forest trees.   
Fruit trees are significant with regard to their economic benefits either in agriculture 
fields (as a windbreaks) or in orchards.  These trees provide fruit as a main product with 
the possibility to provide fuel wood in addition to environmental protection benefits.  In 
Iraq, especially in the southern and middle part of the country, the government 
encouraged farmers to plant date palm and olive trees in agricultural fields to protect the 
field from weather fluctuation impacts, while improving soil quality and production 
capacity (FAO n.d.).  In the northern part of Iraq, where the precipitation is generally 
greater than other parts of the country, different species are suitable to use in different 
agroforestry activities (Hussein 1998).   
According to experiments conducted at Mosul University in Iraq in 2007, the results 
shows that two species of forest trees, Robinia pseudoacacia and Leucaena leucocephala, 
are very successful in the areas with a mean rainfall between 600 mm to 400 mm.  These 
two species are fast growing trees and therefore they produce high amounts of biomass 
and green manure in a short period of time.  In addition they provide other benefits such 
as protecting farm plants from winds and weather fluctuations, and improvement of soil 
structure and properties.  For example Robinia pseudoacacia and Leucaena leucocephala 
significantly improved physical characteristics of soil such as bulk density, particle 
density, porosity, and infiltration rates.  The improvement of soil organic matter and 
chemical characteristics such as pH, organic matter, total N, and K were significant too.  
Finally, nutrient concentration improved significantly through using both addressed 





The recommendations regarding the application of agroforestry systems in the North of 
Iraq and Kurdistan Region are the following:  
1. Implement the right agroforestry system designs in the right places: 
 In non-guaranteed rainfall zones, place trees throughout the land in order to 
provide shelter for livestock, in addition to improving soil and water conservation 
and providing food, fodder and fuel wood,  
 In guaranteed rainfall zones, where monoculture design is dominating land use 
activities, use shelterbelts, windbreaks and living fences around big farms.  These 
agroforestry designs are the best designs to motivate land owners to implement 
agroforestry systems in big farms because they will restrict the farm’s use for 
grain production.  Also, the landowners will get a variety of benefits from these 
systems such as protecting farm from winds, while providing green manure, 
food, fodder, and fuel wood 
 In hilly and mountainous zones, establish terraces along contour lines to protect 
the land from erosion and plant forest and fruit trees and shrubs on them.  
2. In addition to planting multipurpose trees in non-guaranteed rainfall zones, follow 
strategies to improve the quality and quantity of herbaceous species,  
3. Improve efficiency of using rain water, and  
4. Balance the land use and its carrying capacity. 
 Sand Dune Fixation: Sand dune movement is a significant issue in Iraq, especially in the 
southern and middle parts of the country.  Figure 30 below shows the geographic 
distribution of sand dunes in Iraq.  Controlling these sand dunes is significant to combat 
desertification in Iraq.  Two categories of methods were used to control sand dunes: 






The mechanical method that covers mobile sand dunes with clay soil by using 
chain -tractor 
Bulldozer, weal 
shovel and leveling 
grader to stabilize 
sand dunes.  The 
mechanical 
methods showed a 
significant success 
through increases in 
vegetative cover 
after stopping sand 
dune shifts.  After 
stabilizing sand 
dunes the natural 
regeneration started to emerge.  One to two years later the vegetation recovered.  
Generally, 1,250,000 hectares of sand dunes are controlled by this method in south Iraq 
but an area twice as big needs to be managed in the same way
22
.  The biological method 
provides a sustainable stabilization of sand dunes shifting through establishing 
windbreaks and shelter belts beside vegetation cover.  Drought and salinity tolerant 
species of trees and shrubs are used for that purpose.  About 5,000,000 seedlings were 
planted for that purpose, especially in southern Iraq.  But about 400,000 hectares need to 
be managed in the same way (AL-Farrajii 2000).   
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The recommendations to combat sand dunes are the following: (1) pay particular 
attention to fixing sand dunes by using both mechanical and biological methods, (2) 
establish new nurseries and increase the productivity of the available ones to produce 
salinity and drought tolerant trees and shrubs, and (3) maintain and manage the controlled 
sand dune regions through controlled grazing and expanding sand dune fixation projects 
to uncontrolled regions. 
 National Parks and Genetic Resources: As mentioned in the previous section, Iraqi 
forests, rangelands and natural life have been severely compromised and even destroyed 
since the middle ages and especially during the recent wars and conflicts.  Iraq started 
plant genetic resources improvement activities in 1977 to collect plant species and 
improve biodiversity in the country through collaboration among Iraqi Minister of 
Agriculture, FAO and International Board for Plant Genetic Resources.  But in the 
second Gulf War the plant genetic bank collapsed and most of its components were 
destroyed or stolen (FAO - Iraqi Office 2004).  The only hope for restoring plant genetic 
bank is to use what is protected outside Iraq for instance by the International Board for 
Plant Genetic Resources. 
Establishing national parks is a significant way to combat desertification.  
National Parks will assist protecting biodiversity and provide a source of drought and salt 
tolerant tree and shrub species in arid and semi arid zones.  Desertification is eroding 
habitat and plant and animal population in arid lands and narrowing the genetic base of 
drought tolerant species in addition to depleting biodiversity.  Therefore, conserving 
genetic resources is a significant way to promote survival and reproduce drought and salt 
tolerant species in arid and semi-arid lands.  This in turn will increase the productivity of 
arid and semi-arid lands.  Also, these species are playing a significant role reclaiming 





The following are recommendations to conserve and improve biodiversity and 
genetic diversity in Iraq: (1) rehabilitate a genetic resources center that was established in 
1977 and destroyed in Second Gulf War, (2) research the current available species and 
their status, (3) identify the endangered and rare species and the opportunities to 
rehabilitate them, (4) establish genetic and biodiversity banks in different parts of the 
country, (5) establish national parks to protect available and native species, and (6) 
cooperate with international agencies such as the United Nations agencies to restore 


















In this chapter the conclusion of this thesis is identified.  The following are the major 
conclusion of this thesis:  
1. The division of the Tigris and Euphrates River Basins among newly established nations 
at the end of a First World War created a complicated problem for the newly 
established nations in the Basin.  The Tigris and Euphrates Rivers were considered an 
internal system during the time of Ottoman Empire and therefore there were no 
agreements to identify or resolve legal cases involving these two rivers but after the 
World War I as a result of creation of relatively newly established nations, the Tigris 
and Euphrates River were not considered internal (National) rivers because they were 
divided among new established nations. 
2. The global climate change problem along with the fast growth of the region’s 
population created significant barriers to implement a management model that satisfies 
all players. 
3. The destruction of Iraqi forests in the north and date palm orchards and marshlands in 
the central and southern regions resulted in sharply reduced vegetation cover in Iraq.  
Therefore, Iraq is extremely vulnerable to climate change and desertification. 
4. Turkey’s GAP project, Syria’s water management strategies and Iran’s water resource 
plans resulted in decreasing water availability in Iraq.  Therefore, stimulating recovery 
of Iraq’s vegetation cover is not an easy task and will require multilateral treaties based 





5. Demand for increasing irrigated lands in all basin nations caused damage to the 
environment through increasing soil salinity, alkalinity, and changing its structure in 
addition to depleting biodiversity. 
6. Hussein’s strategy to increase irrigated lands in response to the UN economic sanctions 
against Iraq along with irrigated land expansion in Syria and Turkey caused further 
destruction of already depleted marshlands and date palm orchards in Iraq.     
7. As a result of population growth in the region, the region’s nations including Kurdistan 
moved toward monoculture systems in order to meet agricultural self-sufficiency and 
be agricultural product exporters.  
8. Use of modernization theory resulted in developing a monoculture dominated 
agricultural system, which causes decreased land productivity in the short term and 
desertification in long term. 
9. Identifying environmental refugees in Iraq is very hard as a result of poor security 
conditions.  However, the population of internally and externally displaced people is 
above 4 million out of an overall population of about 31 million. 
10. Desertification undermines land productivity, biological and genetic diversity, food 
production, livelihoods, health, environmental and national security. 
11. Global climate change scenarios show further complications of the existing issues in 
the basin. 
12. The Tigris and Euphrates Rivers Basin needs an interdisciplinary plan to develop the 





13. The basin needs regional and international cooperation based on economic, 
environmental and security factors in order to develop a survival strategy that confronts 
the regional security issues and environmental challenges. 
14. The basin nations should develop advanced strategies regarding efficient use of water, 
combating droughts, while promoting economic and environmental development of the 
basin, 
15. A regional and international cooperation agreement is needed to restore depleted 
ecosystems especially in Iraq. 
16. The consequences of any conflicts regarding controlling resources among/between 
riparian nations will undermine regional and international security. 
17. The solution to desertification in Iraq and Kurdistan Region goes beyond Iraq’s border.  
Desertification problems in Iraq will not be solved unless the Tigris and Euphrates 
River Basin Nations agree on a fair and sustainable management of these two rivers.  
Therefore, the internally proposed solutions are only a part of the overall solution but 
not a sufficient on their own. 
18. Rainwater harvesting systems and efforts to increase vegetative cover are the most 
important methods to reduce the influences of desertification in Iraq. 
19. Immediate and effective policies are required to manage lands in Iraq and the Kurdistan 
region to prevent further destruction of land resources through moving toward 
monoculture systems in response to political and economic demands. 
In short, any solutions to desertification and political instability in Iraq and other 





the most important driving factor behind desertification in Iraq is water shortage in the Tigris and 
Euphrates Rivers as a result of Turkey’s water management policies.  Therefore, the effort must 
be put toward establishing a regional cooperation agreement and set of practices in the Tigris and 
Euphrates Rivers Basin to develop the basin as a single ecosystem.  Implementing the proposed 
strategies in chapter five are significant in some parts of Iraq such as Northern Iraq and the 
Kurdistan Region.  However, Northern Iraq and Kurdistan Region are not protected from 
environmental refugees and dust bowls as consequences of desertification in other parts of Iraq. 
Providing a timeline for implementing these proposed solutions regarding watershed 
management among riparian nations is impossible because of these reasons: (1) the available 
water in both rivers is not enough to meet the current and future demands and therefore each  
country tries to get the best results for itself, (2) the tensions still present are rooted in historic 
issues among/between nations as identified in the previous JTC meetings among them since 
1960s, and (3) any negotiations among these nations opens the gate to other problems 
among/between these nations, which need time to be solved. 
It is possible to provide a timeline to implement rainwater harvesting systems and 
developing forestry systems to combat desertification in the Kurdistan Region.  Currently the 
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is implementing agricultural strategies in order to 
achieve agricultural self sufficiency in the next five years (Kurdistan Regional Government 2009) 
and to be a net exporter of agricultural products in the next ten years.  But the agricultural 
development strategies are unsustainable strategies because the KRG stimulates farmers to: (1) 
increase the land productivity through implementing subsidized irrigation systems, (2) use 
subsidies for chemical fertilizers, and (3) pursue unsustainable tapping of rechargeable or 





Implementing the two proposed solutions, rainwater harvesting systems and forestry 
systems, to combat desertification requires 5 – 10 years through modifying the current five years 
(2010 - 2014) agricultural strategies that are underway in the Kurdistan Region.  Even though 
implementing rainwater harvesting systems and forestry systems might increase the time needed 
to reach agricultural self-sufficiency in the short term,  in the long term these two systems will 
make agricultural strategies more sustainable because: (1) they depend more on rainwater than on 
groundwater, (2) they reduce use of chemical fertilizer as a result of availability of biological 
fertilizer from forest trees, (3) they improve the regional ecosystem, which in turn improves land 
productivity, and (4) they result in soil, water, environmental, biodiversity and genetic diversity 
conservation benefits.  Therefore both of them are attractive and high priority methods for 















Appendix 1: Shows Natural trees forest (Native trees)-Kurdistan region-Iraq (Agrawi 2008). 
N. Scientific name English name   
1-  Quercus aegilops Oak 
2-  Quercus infectoria Oak 
3-  Quercus libani Oak 
4-  Populus  nigra Poplur 
5-  Populus euphratica Poplur 
6-  Populus alba Poplur 
7- Salix acmophylla Willow 
8-  Platanus orientalis Orientalis plant 
9-  Celtis tournifortii  
10-  Crataegus  azarolus Azoral  
11-  Rhus coriaria  Summaq   
12-  Aser   sp. Ashy maple 
13- Tamarix  articalata   Tamarisk  
14-  Olea  europeca Olever  
15-  Cercis siliquastrum Judas tree  
16-  Nerum olender Olender 
17-  Juglanus regia  Walnut 
18-  Pistacia  khinjuk Turpentine tree 
19-     Pistacia mutica Pistachio 
20-  Pinus  brutia  Brutian pine  
21-  Juniperus oxycedrus  Juniper  
22-  Pyrus syrica   Pear  
23-  Myrtus communis   
24-  Prunus amygdalis Almond 
25-  Prunus mahaleb  
26-  Prunus Arabica  
27-  Prunus microcarpa  Pubescnt 
28-  Pseudo negundo  Chast 
29-  Rubus sonctus  
30-  Morus alba   Mulberry 
31-  Ficus  carica fig tree 
32- Fraxinus  rotundifolia Ash tree  
33-   Tamarix  macrocarpe Tamarix 
34- Salix alba Willow 







Appendix 2: Exotic trees in the Kurdistan Region (Agrawi 2008). 
N. Scientific name English name 
1- Pinus pinea  Stone Pine   
2- pinus halepensis                                                                    Aleppo pine
3-  Cupressus sempervineas v-
horizantalis 
Cypress 
4- Cupressus sempervineas v- 
pyramidalis 
Cypress 
5-  Cupressus arizonica Cypress 
6- Thja orentalis Arborvite 
7-  Eucalyptus camaldulensis Eucalyptus  
8- Acacia  sp. Blue leafed wattle 
9-  Albizzia lebbek Albizzia 
10-  Ailathus glandulosa Quassia 
11-  Melia azedarach Melia   
12-  Robinia  pseudoacacia  Robinia  
13-  Pistacia vera  Pistachio 
14-  Catalpa bignoniodias Catalpa 
15-  Gladitsia  triacathos Honey locust 
16-  Casuarina equisetifolia  Horsetail tree 
17-  Populus Canadian Poplur  
18-  Platanus  occidentalis  
  19-  Acacia Arabica Egyptian thorn  
20-  Acacia cyonophlla  Blue leafed wattle  
21- Dalbergia sisso Sisso 
22- Bauhinia alba Screw bean 
23-  Tilia glabra   
24-  Juglanus nigra  Walnut 
25- Morus nigra  Mulberry  
26-  Porkinsona  aculeate  
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